Sino-India Relations: With Special Reference to Border Disputes
(Arunachal Pradesh & Axsai Chin)

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ABSTRACT of

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Border disputes are major causes of tensions between neighbors’ worldwide. In modern times, the problem started with the rise of Nation-States in the wake of Westphalia Treaty in 1648 in Europe. This paved way to the birth of several sovereign states in Europe. The making and unmaking of sovereign independent states are still going on. The European Colonial powers fought several battles including two World Wars and Cold War and to a large extent they have successfully managed their border issues. But the legacies in the form of border disputes in several colonial and semi-colonial countries remained unsettled and got erupted in the aftermath of the end of the Colonial System after the end of the Second World War in 1945. Sino-India dispute is one of such issues still haunting Global Politics in 21st century. The issue has to be studied, researched and analysed in a broader perspectives. The issue under research is historical, descriptive and empirical attempt to understand the dispute badly affecting the two most important civilizations of the World. Never in the long annals of Asia, India and China have ever fought any kind of battle; rather have exchanged ideas and many more things with each other.

When the colonial power, Britain, withdrew from India, it left a dangerous legacy of carelessly or arbitrarily drawn borders. In case of the Sino-India border tensions between India and China occasionally flare up, especially along India's far western border (Axsai Chin area) and eastern border along the state of Arunachal Pradesh. In recent years, much to India’s fury, the Chinese officials have taken to calling a part of this area as “South Tibet” in, what is deemed as, a bid to imply a Chinese claim to that territory.

The McMahon Line boundary dispute is at the heart of discordant relations between India and China. China has land and sea boundary issues with 14 neighboring nations, mostly for historical reasons. The Chinese have two major claims on what India considers its own territory. One claim, in the western sector, is on Axsai Chin in the north-eastern section of Ladakh District in Jammu and Kashmir. The other claim is in the eastern sector over a region included in the
British-designated North-East Frontier Agency, the disputed part of which India renamed Arunachal Pradesh and made it a state. In the fight over these areas in 1962, the well-trained and well-armed troops of the Chinese People's Liberation Army overpowered the ill-equipped Indian troops, who had not been properly acclimatized to fight at high altitudes.

The border between China and India has never been officially delimited. China's position on the eastern part of the border between the two countries is consistent. Not a single Chinese Government recognizes the "illegal" McMahon Line. For China, the McMahon Line stands as a symbol of imperialist aggression on the country. The so-called "Arunachal Pradesh" dispute is China's most intractable border issue. Geographically, this area is flat and rich in water and forest resources. However, the wide gap between the positions of China and India on this issue makes it difficult for both nations to reach a consensus that might be mutually beneficial.

The era of the late 19th century and the early 20th century was developed with the European colonial powers finding new ways of exercising their influence in Asian region and dividing it up. Tibet was no exception to it. At that time, many kings and empires, from Muhammad Tughluq to the British, had tried to twist Tibet from China, with no significant achievements. Finally, the British came up with a deceitful strategy to divide Tibet from within, so as to create a buffer country between British India and China, just as Mongolia had been divided and part of it made into a buffer country between Russia and China. Sir Henry McMahon proposed the division of Tibet into an ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ Tibet. The Chinese representative saw through British grand designs and smelt a rat and thus left the Shimla Conference. But the matter didn’t end there. A note was affixed to the Shimla Accord, which enclosed a map display a part of Tibetan territory as Indian, based on a thick red line known as the McMahon line. Additionally, China was barred from any rights and privileges of the Accord with respect to Tibet.

The major territories which are disputed between these two countries can be divided into three distinct parts:

1) The **Western Sector** - Axsai Chin, which lies to the east of the Kashmir valley, covering an area of about 37,250 sq.km (14,380 sq.mi) – It is administered by China as part of Xinjiang Autonomous Region, but is also claimed by India as a part of
the Ladakh district of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The historical claims on the Axsai Chin areas are more doubtful. There has never been any solid demarcation of this region. British Bharat was concerned about Russian designs in this area, and hereafter proposed to make the Karakorum Pass as the boundary, so as to again make a buffer country between Xinjiang/China and India.

In early 1880, India and China agreed the Karakoram Pass as the stable point of boundary, while leaving both sides of the Karakorum pass indefinite. In the mid-1890, again China claimed Axsai Chin as its own territory, and voiced the claim to MacDonald-McCartney\(^1\) line in 1896, whose sketched part of the British boundary in the Himalaya. Sir McCartney presented the privilege to the British who decided with his comment that the part of Axsai Chin was in China and part in British territory. For now, the forward school of British strategists in London proposed that the British should not only include the whole area of Axsai Chin, but also all the area given to Kashmir in 1865.

In 1899, the British proposed to China that the whole of Axsai Chin would remain Chinese territory and the boundary would be along the Karakoram Range. Till date, this remains the status quo. The Karakoram pass falls precisely on the boundary of territory controlled by India and China, marking the northern end of Sino – Indian border, known as the Line of Actual Control. The boundaries at the two extremities, Pangong Lake and Karakoram Pass, were well defined, but the Axsai Chin area in between lay undefined. However, at that time, China did not reply to this proposal; something which it would regret for years. If it had responded, the fate of Axsai Chin would have been sealed then and there. Jawaharlal Nehru, the then Indian prime minister, for his part, appeared willing to play down the Indian claims to the Axsai Chin. He tried to delay disclosure of the news that the Chinese had built a road in that area. After the news had been exposed, he sought after to play down the economic significance of this area, describing it as

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\(^1\) Sir George Macartney, (19 January 1867 –19 May 1945), was the British general in Kashgar at the end of the 19th century. He was succeeded by Sir Clarmont Skrine. Macartney arrived in Xinjiang in 1890 as interpreter for the Younghusband expedition. He remained there until 1918. Macartney first proposed the Macartney-MacDonald Line as the boundary between China and India in Axsai Chin.
“barren tundra” and where “not even a blade of grass grows”. He flat went so far as to cast doubt on the validity of the Indian claim to Axsai Chin.

In statements to the Indian Parliament during early 1959, Nehru pointed out that “…during British rule, this area was neither inhabited, nor were there any outposts, ……this place, Axsai Chin area, is distinguished completely from other areas. It is a matter for argument which part belongs to us and which part belongs to somebody else. It is not clear”.

2) **The Middle Sector** – There are a few small part of territory in between the Eastern sector and Western sectors, but they are essentially irrelevant when compared to these two main distinct territories. This Area stretches from the Southern extremity of Kashmir to Nepal and covers the Indian states of Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand and Sikkim. These borders shared by Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand with Tibet. Shipki La and Kaurik areas in Himachal Pradesh and parts around Pulam, Barahori, Kungrii Bingri La, Thag La, Laphathal and Sangha are disputed.

3) **The Eastern Sector** - The Eastern Sector (Arunachal Pradesh) is other portion of the Sino-Indian boundary disputes from the Bhutan tri-junction in the West to the Myanmar tri-junction in the East. The affected Indian state is NEFA (now Arunachal Pradesh). In this Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, which China calls South Tibet, China disputes India's state over 90,000 square kilometer, most of the disputed part in Arunachal Pradesh. Tawang, Asaphi La, Bomdila Bum La and Lo La are among the sensitive areas in this region. Strategically vital Tawang stays the key to the defence of the entire sub-Himalayan space in this region.

The McMahon line is the source of the Indian claim to this area which was formerly known as the North-East Frontier Agency, and has since developed the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. It was drawn with a complete contempt for cartographic methods and the geography of the area. The scale used in NEFA was eight miles to an inch.

The Shimla Conference treaty map is topographically vague (as the treaty was not accompanied with demarcation), and the treaty includes no oral description of geographic

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features nor description of the peak ridges. There is no scientific method which uses cartographic methods to identify the geographical location of the line. The McMahon line was exactly a line on paper.

The undefined boundary in the western sector reflects the British failure to successfully negotiate a boundary-settlement with China. The frontier in this sector includes a large piece of territory known as Axsai Chin projecting out to the north-east. The altitude of this area is over 16000 feet and the composition of its soil make it unfit for human habitation but has considerable strategic value to the Chinese for forming the shortest road link between Tibet and Sinkiang.

In the eastern sector, the McMahon Line came into existence in 1914 at Shimla which was accepted by India and Tibet but not by China though the Chinese representative at the Conference had not at any time complained about this bilateral agreement between India and Tibet defining 850 miles of their borders. Independent India’s policy towards its north-eastern border particularly Tibet was under sporadic consideration even before the civil war in China ended as it was felt that a strong Chinese Government would advance claims to the region below the McMahon Line.

India China relations have "strategic significance" and "global impact" as both are large developing countries and emerging markets. Chinese Premier Li Keqiang told as much to the visiting external affairs minister Salman Khurshid in May 2013, and on his return, the minister, in a press interview, said that “India and China have to collaborate for the Asian century”. Shaping this vision should be the top agenda of the high-level dialogue later this month. Changing the political relationship between two rising powers seeking to establish their territorial integrity, identity and rightful place in world affairs requires that both countries use the opportunity provided by their shared interest in global governance reform to develop close cooperation, which will lead to a demarcated border rather than let a colonial legacy dominate bilateral relations.

Both sides have differences in perception of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the Sino-India border areas. Both sides carry out patrolling activity in the Sino-India border areas. Beyond the limits the LAC are taken up through diplomatic channels at Border Personnel Meetings/Flag Meetings. India and China seek a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable
settlement of the boundary question through peaceful Meetings. Sino- India Border disputes are the only issue which has a potential conflict/Threat. If ever, India and China go to war one day, it will be on this issue. India considers recurring Sino-Indian border clashes a potential threat to its security. Since the last war, each side continued to improve its military and logistics capabilities in the disputed regions.

**Conceptual Framework of the Study**

The purpose of undertaking this research work is the occurrence of significant changes during this period of time. Additionally, the most important factor was that political scientist and analysts could slightly notice the reason behind the sprouting of a number of political reasons behind the border disputes which has become a cause and a symptom of tensions between big neighbours in South Asia. When the colonial power, Britain, withdrew from India it left a dangerous legacy of carelessly or arbitrarily drawn borders. A failure to agree upon the precise border, and then to successfully demarcate it, ensured that disagreements kept flaring up between India and her neighbours.

The present study had focus on pros and cons of the border disputes. The Border tensions between India and China occasionally flare up, especially along India's far western border (Aksai Chin) and eastern border along the state of Arunachal Pradesh. In recent years, much to India’s fury, the Chinese officials have taken to calling a part of this area as “South Tibet” in, what is deemed as, a bid to imply a Chinese claim to that territory.

In this study, I have tried to explore all aspects of Sino-India Border Disputes in the view of different angle. The border between China and India has never been officially delimited. China's position on the eastern part of the border between the two countries is consistent. Not a single Chinese government recognizes the "illegal" McMahon Line. For China, the McMahon Line stands as a symbol of imperialist aggression on the country. The so-called "Arunachal Pradesh" dispute is China's most intractable border issue. Geographically, this area is flat and rich in water and forest resources. However, the wide gap between the positions of China and India on this issue makes it difficult for both nations to reach a consensus that might be mutually beneficial. Based on this overall frame of study, aims, objectives and also the hypothesis are set.
The objectives of the present study aim to reveal the trends and changes regarding the Sino-India Relations: with Special Reference to Border Disputes (Arunachal Pradesh & Axsai Chin)

The proposed study would look into within these facts;

- To evaluate Chinese strategy and approach towards Arunachal Pradesh and Axsai Chin.
- To study the role of developed countries in Sino-India border disputes.
- To analyse whether Sino-India border clashes pose a potential threat to their border security.
- To identify the various initiatives for resolving the border disputes in the Sino-India dispute.

Hypothesis of the study has been as follows;

- The border disputes play a very crucial role in shaping and organizing relationship between the two countries.
- Geo-political and colonial factors are responsible for the Sino-India border disputes.
- Pakistan plays as a fulcrum in the Sino-India Dispute.

The research work has include historical, empirical and descriptive study of the Sino-India border dispute. It is a qualitative research. It includes both primary and secondary sources. The main primary sources are Government document, Publication, reports and unpublished document related to peace treaties and Sino-India Disputes. The secondary sources of data include the information given by international figures who took an active part in giving India and China a definite shape in international scenario. Also include books, journals, magazines, newspapers, abstracts to give appropriate shape to the findings. The field observation was conducted during the research that has strengthened the study.

Arunachal Pradesh and Axsai Chin are taken as case studies of the radical change in the critical situation of international scenario. The independent variables are the national interest, their political objectives, developmental approach, massive support in favour of them and the
dependent variable consists of stability factor of the Government, changing pattern of 21\textsuperscript{st} century international politics, and the increasing ratio of border disputes as well as economic relations.

A qualitative analysis has been conducted to determine the main features of the neighbouring countries, their performance, economic reforms in the pre-war and post-war period and the ever changing political interests over the decades. This research aims to give a wide understanding of the Sino-Indian relationship, rather than trying to generalize and measure variable with statistics. As qualitative methods focuses on exploration and clear cut understanding of the problem, usually based on historical reflections, events and processes, it suits the purpose of this research well. Additionally, this research will have a holistic perspective where emphasis will not be laid on single variables, but rather on the whole, thus placing the analysis in a historical, temporary, as well as international context.\footnote{A. Vromen, (2012), “\textit{Debating Methods: Rediscovering Qualitative Approaches}”, in Theory and Methods in Political Science, 3rd Edition, by D. March and G. Stoker, Palgrave Macmillan p. 249, 257.}

The research will interpret the relationship, in order to give a further understanding and emphasis on the area study. As this research has been taken an interpretive approach, it is important to make conscious choices of what is relevant and not. The Interpretive approach also reflects the more ‘soft’ aim of the research to ‘understand’ processes, rather than to explain objective phenomenon. Thus, looking at the actors’ interaction, in this research being China and India, as part of the social world where nothing can be concrete or certain, it logically leads the research towards an understanding of the situation, rather than giving explanations.

**Major Findings:**

1. The major disputes in between India and China is due to the lack of properly demarcated border line. In 1950s, India was surprised to see an officially circulated Chinese map where disputed boundary alignment between India and China was shown. According to Chinese Map Mcartney-McDonald line is Correct, it is approximately the same as the present Line of Actual Control but it is not accepted by India. The official Chinese map had shown 50,000 sq. miles area of the Indian Territory and
they possess that area after India-China war 1962. In July 1959 an Indian army group, patrolling the Axsai Chin area, was caught by some Chinese troops who had entered into the Ladakh region, similar incident was also carried out in NEFA in August 1959. It was to show by force that these regions belonged to China and the Indian personnel were wrongfully found on their land In September 1959 Chou En Lai, the Chinese Prime Minister, demanded 50,000 sq. miles of the Indian territory and within two weeks the Chinese forces landed up in Ladakh and dared to start a small scale war. For nearly a decade, India sincerely wanted a peaceful and good neighbourly relationship with China but from time to time the border disputes disturb Political and Economic relations.

2. Another reason of Disputes between India and China is the asylum of the Spiritual Leader of Tibet, Dalai Lama seeking from India. In 1959 Chinese had possessed over Tibetan region and Dalai Lama seeking their asylum in India. Now Dalai Lama is reside in India (Dharmashala) and opposing the Chinese possession over Tibet.

3. On the border issue, positive steps could be seen by ways of maintenance of peace and tranquillity, initiation of various confidence-building measures, exchange of maps according to sectors and seeking clarifications on each other’s position. Furthermore, with the appointment of special representatives on the border issue, another step has been taken in the right direction. It seemed that the adoption of political approach could go a long way in resolving this long standing problem in Sino-Indian relations. From 2003 to 2007, special representatives have held eleven rounds of talks. By then both India and China had adopted a pragmatic approach to solve their boundary as well as other disputes.

4. Both the countries had adopted different mechanism from time to time to resolve the boundary dispute but could not fully reach its final solution due to different reasons such as lack of political will, differences existing
on claims from both sides, Sino-Pak collaboration, USA factor, differences of opinion on both sides, domestic problems, Tibet problem, lack of proper preparatory work, India-Soviet encirclement, India’s nuclear test, small incidents on border areas and recently the wording of Chinese Ambassador Sun Yuxi, “Arunachal Pradesh as Chinese territory”. All these casted negative impact upon the process of negotiation. It always seemed that after a particular negotiation or visit of leaders, when the expectation of producing concrete results and solutions were highest, some incident or comment damaged the relationship once more, and the problems remained the same.

5. The fast changing political climate has to face the diverse challenges. Most importantly, these challenges appear in the form of non-compromising behaviour, USA and Pakistan factor, lack of political will or to only linger on the issue etc. In order to safeguard the precarious balance of power between India and Pakistan, China gradually developed a close defence relation with Pakistan and carefully nurtured it. Chinese arms transfer and nuclear assistance to Pakistan can prove counterproductive to India. India was against China’s attempt to supervise the subcontinent in following the May 1998 nuclear test (Pokhran) or to mediate in New Delhi-Islamabad rivalry during Kargil conflict in May 1999, because India perception is that intervention of China in India-Pak relationship maybe problematic.

6. Another important factor that many times hindered the Sino-Indian relationship is divergent perception for their capacities to dominate South Asian region. Not only India and China but there are others also who play key role, negative or positive, in regional power balance like Soviet Russia, Sri Lanka and Pakistan and Myanmar etc. China perceived itself as part of South Asia because of geographical reasons, historical linkages and common heredity with the Mongoloid group of people in India, Nepal and Bhutan. Consequently, China considers itself in the intra-regional
affairs of South Asia. On the other hand, India had its own thoughts about its role and perception because of its ‘big brother’ attitude. It viewed China’s attempt to forge close relations with its South Asian neighbours as hostile act.

7. The Crucial role of USA which has been directly affected the Sino-India relations, India-Pakistan relation and Pakistan-China relations. From cold war to post cold war and from post-cold war to the era of terrorism, the USA has been taking keen interest in South Asia but since 2001 attack on WTC, it has completely got involved in South Asia and Central Asia and USA has tried to implant its military roots in the entire region in the name of ‘war against terrorism’.

8. Both India and China have express their worried about different moves of USA in relation to their own security status. India worries that China may use its permanent membership in UN Security Council and its relationship with Washington to block New Delhi from taking its appropriate place on the world stage. After the cold-war era, the USA paid more attention to China in comparison to India in Asia Pacific and world affairs. India was identified as being friendly with the USSR. Thus the policies of USA concentrated more on equation with China, alliance with Gulf countries and stable defence relations with Pakistan etc. It did not consider India a significantly important country. Also, both the USA and China have a common interest to make India sign up the international non-proliferation treaty and give up nuclear weapons.

Validation of Research Hypotheses

The research hypotheses that have been put up in the beginning of the study are either validated or proved null through this research.

- The first hypotheses states that ‘The border disputes play a very crucial role in shaping and organizing relationship between the two countries’. Neither India
nor China has allowed the bilateral relation to be hijacked by the border disputes alone, but even from time to time the border disputes disturb Political and Economic relation. Bilateral relations have improved since the 1980s, with eight rounds of border negotiations occurring between 1981 and 1988 and dialogue through the Indian-Chinese Joint Working Group on the border issue between 1988 and 1993, and a border agreement signed in 1993. Even though these relations keep on unstable and competitive, both side have required to reduce tensions. Despite India China border disputes, rejection of market access, and strict words against the Dalai Lama, leaders of the both countries realise the dangers of permitting problems to overpower the relationship. Burgeoning economic agreement between the global two fastest-developing economies country have become the most prominent aspect of their bilateral relationship. Bilateral Trade flows have increased rapidly, from a worthless in 1993, $350 million to $70 billion in 2012, and could exceed $100 billion in 2015. Some joint projects in power generation, consumer goods, chemicals, minerals, steel, mining, transport, info-tech, infrastructure and telecommunication are in the pipeline. Increasing trade, commerce, and tourism could decline the risk factor for China in its relationship with India. The positive side, both share mutual interests in maintaining local stability (for example, combating Islamist fundamentalists), manipulating economic opportunities, and maintaining access to energy bases, and markets.

The second hypotheses reads as, ‘**Geo-political and colonial factors are responsible for the Sino-India border disputes**’. The Sino-India border dispute invented from the British and Russian expansion in Central Asia in the end of 19th century and early 20th century. In the era of 21st Century, there has been a shifting pattern in Chinese mischief along the Indian borders: Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim then Ladakh (Aksai Chin). China’s vested interests Axsai Chin out of security concerns that relate to its economic interests, Beijing would be highly unlikely to let go of Axsai Chin because, firstly, NH 219 is the only veritable all-weather road that connects Tibet and Xinjiang. In that capacity, the road not only facilitates the ability to mobilise troops, but it also provides connectivity between
Infrastructure allows the increase of trade volumes and the movement of people and thereby contributes to regional development. Secondly, Axsai Chin is located at the north-western part of the Tibetan plain, clamped between the Kunlun mountain range to its north that separates Tibet from Xinjiang, and the Karakoram Range of the Himalayas to its west which forms a natural barrier between China and India. If it was to fall under Indian control, it would leave China strategically exposed. Arunachal Pradesh is one of the most strategically placed states because of its common international border with China, Bhutan and Myanmar. Arunachal Pradesh, comprising the mountainous areas laying to the north and east of Assam, is located between the cultivable plantations and oil, Minerals, Natural resources rich basin of Brahmaputra, Lohit River and the Tibetan frontier. China might plan to link the two major oceans of the world i.e. Pacific and the Indian Ocean.

The third hypothesis is, ‘Pakistan plays as a fulcrum in the Sino-India Dispute’. Pakistan is important factor in Sino-India Relations but it is not fulcrum, there are other various factor which are responsible for the Sino-Indian disputes. China and USA are pursuing their own intersect in cooperating with Pakistan. The Chinese involvement in Pakistan is driven purely by its strategic interests. It seems to be devising a multi-pronged agenda to deal with the growing USA influence in the region. The USA and Chinese policy on Kashmir (POK) till the end of the cold war was detriment to Indian interests. During that time, POK did not figure in the US strategic calculus and Pakistan’s control over the region was regarded as legitimate and in the American interests. In a changing regional and global context, the US seems to have revised its policy towards POK as the Chinese interest are expanding towards POK. However, apart from their common concerns about the growing Chinese presence in the region, India and the US may not have similar positions on the status of POK. As in the past, the US has agreed to participate in the ongoing projects in POK, to which India has objected at time to time. The US involvement offers some degree of legitimacy to Pakistan’s illegal occupation of the region. But at the same time, the US foray into POK will certainly countervail the Chinese
strategic presence there. This may indirectly address some of India’s concerns about the growing China-Pakistan nexus in this sensitive region. China and Pakistan have been close allies after the 1962 war between India and China. It has become stronger with the sudden action by USA to eliminate Osama Bin Laden violating Pakistan’s sovereignty. The secret operation rendered Pakistan helpless nuclear power.

**Strength and Limitation of the Study and Scope for Further Research**

Some specific limitations felt during the present study are that most of the information documents in respect of the border areas or declaration of boundaries and most importantly the sources of their origin and constant timely changes by the governments which constrains access. However, this constraint of access did not affect the conclusions of the study. Historical as well as current analyses of the topic of study subjecting it to a comprehensive frame of capturing both Indian and Chinese contexts, factors, trends and forces competing each other as well as in possible combinations constitute the strength of the present research. The specific aspect was found that there were always variation in the declared maps by the governments and the maps of the territory in documents. Moreover, all the time it was not so easy to access the original documents of MOUs between the governments of both of the nations from the embassies.

Another limitation is politico-economical context of the unfolding of the regional or boundary level talks within the specific area. This context is characterized by uncertainties even about the near future. For a while there is clarity about the inevitability of inter-connectedness of ideas among various governments in vastly internationalized phenomena, there are strong undercurrents of uncertainty about the results of the future for the bi-lateral relations. There is also a confusing dichotomy of there being both a steady growth of resolutions into the race of internationalization and regionalization processes and a virtual stillness, which may be momentary in relative terms, in the evolution of a new international politico-relationship. The present study is contextualized by such type of unique limitations, which can be equally read as historical and factual, and not necessarily the limitation of the specific study.
There is scope for recurring academic quest to enquire about the nature of the change of the context in which baseline of the resolution of boundary dispute will evolve in near or farther future and whether it will evolve as presented by the findings of the present study.

Despite the above limitation and future scope for the study, it can be concluded that China has also been following the tenets of the ‘Monroe Doctrine’. The attempt has always been to deny access to other powers in the regions that it considers exclusive to its sphere of influence. Such Chinese actions have been damaging the interests of other regions, especially, the countries in the East and South East Asia. Many of China’s actions in this part of the world would require very careful handling by India. It may be important for India in the current context to understand China’s intentions and fundamental goals. India will always promote constructive engagement with China and avoid any direct confrontation. It would also be in China’s interest if it forges greater and robust partnership with India in the twenty first century.

Another perception from the Chinese side is that, India, by virtue of its geopolitical situation, naval capabilities, unresolved boundary disputes and history of hostility with China, is an ideal country for the USA to ally up in case of any conflict with China. China wonders whether India is going to line up with USA against China or join China and Russia to push for a multi-polar world order against the global domination of the USA. If India did not participate in keeping control over Chinese domination, over the years, China’s rapid development would lessen the strategic pressure of USA on India and if India joins forces with the USA to contain China, the future years may be very challenging to India.

This fact in itself is an ample proof of the positive spirit of both of the nations which are extending their base to the international community and their ever increasing negotiating capacity on the issue of borderline in the interests of the nation. There has been drawn a drastic change in the efforts at the government level and increase in defence personnel participation.
China accused of Indian incursion. It dated the decision one day after the Dalai Lama ended his week-long visit to Arunachal Pradesh. This marks the first time China has officially named regions in the disputed territory. The announcement was made days after India’s foreign ministry spokesman Gopal Baglay said there was no change in India’s position that Tibet was part of China. Related Topics.

China-India border dispute. Followed by 1.4k people. TOPIC. China-India border dispute. India dismisses China’s concerns about Kashmir. New Delhi’s ambassador says decision to strip state of its autonomous status is purely an internal matter. China upset by Modi’s visit to airport site in Arunachal Pradesh. New Delhi urged to respect Chinese interests and concerns, cherish the momentum of improving relations as Beijing firmly opposes leader’s visit. New Delhi urged to respect Chinese interests and concerns, cherish the momentum of improving relations as Beijing firmly opposes leader’s visit. Arunachal Pradesh is not Indian territory but is a disputed part of the Sino-Indian border, China said on Wednesday, adding that by allowing the 14th Dalai Lama to visit the region, New Delhi has violated its commitments on Tibet and the border dispute. The ministry of foreign affairs (MFA) also claimed that the Dalai Lama and Indian officials made provocative statements, which will have a negative impact on settling the territorial disputes through negotiations. We have lessons to learn from history, Lu Kang, MFA spokesperson said in a press briefing, which could be interpreted to be a wa