Kings, Jesters or Kingmakers?
Celebrities in European Populist Parties

Abstract:

The article explores a key aspect in the development of contemporary European populist parties, the celebrity dynamics of their leadership. It presents a systematic comparison of leaders from the main populist parties, exploring the correlation between leadership visibility, fame, and the ideological and organizational characteristics of parties. Further, it investigates the subset of leaders whose public notoriety predates their political involvement, with a view to establishing how they balance the demands of political responsibility and authenticity of character, both in terms of organizational control and of communicative strategy. Analytically, the study helps illuminate the mechanisms through which populist parties adapt to participation in the political game while continuing to mark their ideological difference. Empirically, the findings highlight the uniqueness of an outlier case, Beppe Grillo’s leadership of Italy’s Five Star Movement, in which celebrity is leveraged into a kingmaker role, while still retaining the public persona of an outside observer.

Keywords:

Social capital; political communication; political parties; personalization; charisma; populism.
1. Introduction

Populism is the order of the day: across Europe, populist parties have recently scored resounding electoral victories, and even in the countries in which they have not entered government, their increased strength and confidence is readily perceivable. At the level of political discourse, the various populist movements have been broadly successful in their drive to impose a public agenda that reflects their priorities. A parallel, but distinct trend within these political systems is the emergence of a new form of personalized politics, to which most actors, whether mainstream or marginal, establishment or populist, increasingly conform. Leaders seek new, non-technical forms of expression to address their constituents, new media systems reward innovative communication techniques, new personal parties are born, and traditional parties tend to highlight the figure of their leader over collective decision-making. Individuals who prove adept at this new style of politics reap significant rewards.

The present article aims to study the intersection of these two phenomena, populism and personalization, by analyzing how the leaders of populist parties harness the power of personalized politics for political advantage. In particular, we focus on a subgroup of such leaders, who epitomize this new politics by being able to claim a distance, a separation from traditional political life, an outsider persona. In understanding how such claims to difference from politics-as-usual can contribute to the success of populism, we adopt a comparative focus, aiming to link rhetorical and ideological strategies with organizational characteristics at the party level and structural and institutional determinants at the country level.
Methodologically, we follow a mixed-methods approach, analyzing quantitative data on a large set of European populist parties and leaders, which we then complement with three case studies, two of them (Andrej Babiš of the Czech Republic and Frank Stronach of Austria) representative of the main types of outsider leadership and one (Beppe Grillo of Italy) a very specific and unique outlier, in terms both of organizational/leadership model and of party ideology.

Our argument is intended as a contribution in an ongoing conversation hosted by *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* (Street 2004, Street 2012, Wood et al. 2016) on typologies of celebrity politicians and their role within changing political systems. While we agree on the importance of the phenomenon and its relation with the populist *Zeitgeist*, we read certain key cases (such as Grillo’s) quite differently, and believe that our specific contribution lies in showing the relationship between celebrity dynamics and the more traditional variables of ideological and organizational analysis of political parties.

The article is structured as follows. In the next section, the political science literature on populism, personalization, and celebrities is surveyed. Then, we set out our main theoretical argument concerning outsiders/celebrities, political involvement, and populist rhetoric. Subsequently, we present the results of our analysis, including both a quantitative-based taxonomy and qualitative descriptions of two representative cases and one outlier. Section 6 concludes by reiterating our main findings and suggesting directions for further research.

2. Literature overview

Populist leaders and parties are making headlines worldwide. As Rovira Kaltwasser et al. have recently documented (2017, pp. 9-10), over the last two decades the literature on
populism has literally skyrocketed (see also Heinisch et al. 2017). While there has been a growing consensus on Cas Mudde’s definition of populism as a ‘thin ideology’ (Mudde 2004) scholars are still debating how to measure populism (Pauwels 2017), as well as how to assess its possible consequences (threat or corrective?) for democracy. However, over the last decade several comparative works (e.g. Albertazzi & McDonnell 2008; Van Kessel 2015; Kriesi & Pappas 2015) have identified some determinants for the rise and success of populist parties and leaders.

A full review of the literature on populism falls well beyond the scope of our article. We limit our focus here to works in which populism intersects with other key research agendas –which are also growing on fertile ground– namely, those on the personalization of political leadership and the ‘celebritization’ of politics. In this respect, Moffitt’s book (2016) is innovative both for its global scope and for its peculiar focus on how leaders perform. Moffitt disagrees with authors who do not consider leaders to be fundamental actors in the rise of populism (e.g. Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2014). More specifically, analyzing populism as a political style, Moffitt stresses the importance of the mediatization of politics (Mazzoleni & Schulz 1999) as a prerequisite for ‘performing the crisis’ (crisis being in itself a pre-condition for the rise of populism.) As he claims, “it is the leader that should be our main focus when studying the phenomenon, given that they are the figures that ultimately ‘do’ populism” (Moffitt, 2016, pp. 51–52).

This point ties in with the literature on party politics, which –since the publication of the seminal collection by Poguntke and Webb (2005)– has witnessed a re-invigoration of a research tradition that dates back to Max Weber (see, most recently, Musella 2018). While scholars disagree on the appropriate terms to define the increasing importance of leaders for party organization, for parties in government, and for orienting the electorate (on the
As we document in this article, celebrity has been an important component in the rise of many new populist (and challenger) parties. All in all, as Marsh et al. (2010) point out, ‘the academic literature on celebrity politics is rarely systematic; more often it is superficial and anecdotal. In addition, most of the literature focuses either upon classifying different types/categories of celebrity politician and their roles in politics or upon the question of whether the growth of celebrity politics undermines or enhances democracy’.

Similarly, we argue that the academic literature still lacks a comparative analysis on ‘how [to] anticipate variations in the role that celebrity politics might occupy within a given regime’ (Street 2012, 352). Although this is not directly the focus of our article, we provide some evidence on interesting dynamics related to this point.

From this very broad tour of the secondary literature we can highlight three main points, on which we build our theoretical and empirical investigation. First, we lack a comparative assessment on the dynamics of new leadership for the rise of populist parties in Europe: most existing studies still adopt a national focus, and often privilege case studies. Second, few studies examine the possible links between the structural and institutional determinants of the leadership’s success in the rise of populist parties. Finally, the combination of quantitative and qualitative aspects is an aspect which deserves more attention. In this respect, the selection of particular types of populist leaderships allows us

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1 Unfortunately, this consideration also applies to the recent elaboration of a ‘leadership capital index’ (Bennister et al. 2018).
to focus on some paradigmatic cases, whose trajectories and peculiar use of media outlets clearly shed light on the mechanisms of mediatization and popularization (Street 2016) of politics, and their relation with the success of populism.

To address these issues, this article presents a systematic comparison of leaders from the main European populist parties and explores the correlation between leadership visibility, fame, and the ideological characteristics of their parties. Further, it investigates the subset of leaders whose public notoriety predates their political involvement, with a view to establishing how they balance the demands of political responsibility and authenticity of character, both in terms of organizational control and of communicative strategy.

3. Celebrities, agency, and populism in social theory

By celebrities in this work we mean quite simply individuals possessed of external social capital, in the form of name recognition, public visibility, and—in a certain sense—charisma. This charisma is typically not the charisma of office (such as, say, the British Royal Family or the Pope possess): hence, in a way, celebrity herein is interpreted as a sanction of meritocracy, a recognition of the celebrity being, in some form, an individual who is out of the ordinary. Such social capital, such visibility can originate in many different walks of life: in sports, business, the military, entertainment... It typically assumes a mediated form for public diffusion, in which the means of mass communication decisively shape the perception of individual personality.

From an analytical point of view, therefore, celebrities in politics are a specific instance of the general phenomenon of transferal of forms of social capital from other spheres into
the political sphere. The phenomenon is both fairly well established in democratic political traditions and somewhat puzzling, or at least worthy of theoretical investigation.

Traditionally, the incorporation of celebrities within the political process has been understood in purely instrumental terms. Celebrities, the argument runs, are able to communicate with strata of the population that normally shun political debate and involvement, because they can access channels of communication with the broader public that are normally foreclosed to political speech, institutional rhetoric, and party advertising. Therefore, they can present to such disconnected and apathetic social strata a non-ideological reason for choosing the party the celebrities support; in other words, celebrities can offer a heuristic to disengaged and inattentive citizens with regards to their own political preferences. They are in a position to do so because, with regards to celebrity, the role of public interest is reversed: while politics (it is argued) is akin to advertising in that it must compete for the attention of a public that by default is ill-inclined to listen, celebrities are akin to content because the public is independently drawn to demand, and consume, information about them. Such differentials in visibility and attraction of attention are the reason for the political realm’s interest in celebrity.

In this traditional equilibrium, celebrities were typically part of the ‘front-end,’ or front stage of politics, the communication façade of it, as opposed to the backstage of power-politics and policy-making. Hence, in the words of our title, traditional celebrities were ‘jesters,’ with ‘kings’ bringing them in to the political arena and ‘kingmakers’ out of the limelight judiciously employing their assets for the maximum benefit of the party. A classic example of such a celebrity politics was the cooptation of former athletes as parliamentary personnel (for instance, the Olympic champion Sebastian Coe’s stint as a Tory MP during the mid 1990s).
Even in this traditional configuration, some margin existed for evolution and independent agency of celebrities in politics. For instance, in certain realms of advocacy, celebrities could, in part, weigh on the formulation of a policymaking agenda. An example can be the evolution of rockstar Bono Vox and his influence on the international development aid policy sphere, especially with regard to priorities in Africa. Obviously, such independent agency was compounded when celebrities brought not only notoriety resources to bear, but material ones as well, as in the case of mega-donors and foundation creators such as Bill Gates. In all these cases, from a rhetorical point of view one witnesses a shift from a self-presentation as an agent ‘doing good’ in an uncontroversial role as ‘attention grabber,’ to a more active role for the celebrity, weighing in on issues and choices. Charitable giving therefore served as a bridge between generic public visibility and the policy world, allowing celebrities to learn the language of public interest and acquire policy legitimacy.

What we are interested in specifically in this article, however, is a much more direct involvement of celebrities within partisan political organization: the leadership by political outsiders (i.e. individuals who did not spend the whole of their career in politics) of populist parties. The assumption by visible outsiders, by non-politicians, of political power within populist movements is premised on precisely the characteristics that made celebrity traditionally appealing to the political sphere (and would – incidentally – have made celebrities lose any distinctive appeal if they had forsworn them).

The main assumption on which our analysis rests can be stated thus: celebrities (the ‘star system’) have ‘elective affinities’ with the way of doing and communicating politics typical of populism (as variously defined). The communicative characteristics celebrities and populists share are apparent, and numerous: disintermediation, transparency, a different,
non-technical, layman’s way of speaking about politics, a claim of (existential) difference with respect to professional politicians, an incompatibility with the technocratic elite, a celebration of charisma and leadership.

Indeed, because of general factors influencing all contemporary political life (but compounded in the case of populist parties) most all party leaders nowadays tend to assume certain aspects of celebrity (e.g. a type of media visibility that blurs public and private life). However, as has been explored in the literature (Street 2004), we can distinguish politicians who have achieved some measure of celebrity through politics from celebrities who have achieved some measure of political power through celebrity. Hence, our goal in these pages will be to focus on the latter category, political outsiders who have moved to positions of political power, within the context of the Continent-wide populist wave.

In attempting to understand what sets this group of outsider leaders apart from their professional-politician populist brethren (and with all due caution deriving from the preliminary, exploratory nature of our present endeavor and the data it relies on), we seek to find empirical corroboration for hypotheses originally formulated by t’Hart et al. (2009) regarding the conditions for the rise of celebrity politicians. These hypotheses are: (1) the more endemic public disaffection with ‘politics as usual’, the bigger the political space for even the most unlikely types of celebrities to run for office successfully; (2) the stronger the market share of tabloids and entertainment media, and the more their news-making styles have pervaded the reporting of politics in a polity, the bigger the political opportunity structure for aspiring celebrity politicians; (3) in established democracies, the average tenure of celebrity politicians is shorter than that of professional ones.
4. Classifying populist celebrities

We have collected data on more than five dozen European populist parties active in the period 1999-2018 and their leaders. We have identified a series of indicators at three different levels, relating to the party (performance, ideology, organization) the leaders, and the country (prevailing attitudes within the electorate, national media system, party system). The full description is provided in the appendix. We use such data in two ways. First, we examine what distinguishes the subset of leaders who have not spent their whole life in politics from populist leaders as a whole. Then, we offer an inductive taxonomy of populist leadership. The distribution of ‘outsider’ leaders not being uniform across such groups, we use the taxonomy as a guide in choosing the qualitative case studies that complete our analysis.

a. What sets outsiders apart

Our first series of observations regarding the data concern the comparison between the group of populist leaders as a whole and the subset of outsiders. The data is quite noisy, with large variance, but some general information can be gleaned. In many ways, the two groups are similar. For instance, the best result of the parties is virtually indistinguishable (15.7% vs. 15.5% of vote share, and 3.8 vs. 4.0 in party rank, although outsider-led parties are significantly more likely, 30% to 21%, to be the first party). Participation in government is similarly close (45% for populist parties, 47% for outsider-led ones), as is ideological orientation (6.56 vs. 6.3 on parlgov’s L-R index). Outsiders, however, are more likely to be the founders of the party they lead (86% vs. 69% for all populist parties), which is
corroborated by the fact that 91% of their parties are new parties in the period under consideration (vs. 75% overall).

Furthermore, the measure of anti-establishment attitudes in the countries with outsider-led parties at time of entry is higher (27.91) than the average for all countries in the study (24.42). Similarly, outsider leaders come from political contexts with less societal trust towards politics: the averages for all three Eurobarometer trust indicators are lower in the case of outsider-led parties than among all cases, most notably in terms of trust in parliaments. Finally, taking 2008 as the conventional date for the beginning of the global financial crisis, outsider-led parties are more likely to have entered parliament after this date (43%) than are populist parties overall (39%). All these findings suggest that t’Hart et al.’s hypothesis (1) is corroborated by our data.

A finer look at the data suggests other differences setting the subgroup apart. For one thing, geographically the outsider-led populist party phenomenon is concentrated in post-Communist countries (60% of the cases in Eastern Europe fall into this category, vs. 45% overall, and an outsider-led populist party is present in nine out of fifteen countries in Eastern Europe, but only in eleven out of twenty-eight overall). It is also the case that outsider-led populist parties flourish in party ecosystems in which there is more than one populist party: of the twelve countries with only one populist party (about 43% of the whole) only one has an outsider leader. This condition of outsider-friendliness in competitive populist markets holds in Eastern Europe (only three of eleven countries in our survey have only one populist party) more than in Western Europe (nine of seventeen).

Moreover, outsiders tend to have shorter tenures as leaders: the average length of their stint atop the party is 10.5 years vs. 12.5 overall, a tendency heightened at the extremes, with only 13% of outsiders having maintained leadership for over twenty years (vs. 20%
overall), while 26% have led for less than five years (vs. 16% overall – although many are still ongoing). Hence, it appears that t’Hart et al.’s hypothesis (3) is also corroborated by our data.

In terms of media markets, there are significant confounders, given the geographic clustering of outsiders in Eastern Europe. However, it is interesting to explore the variation within each of the two halves of the Continent. Although most cases, both overall (35%) and within the outsider group (26%), fall into media market type B (the German model of North-Central Europe), it is type A (the Mediterranean model) among Western countries that is the least underrepresented among outsiders. Arguably, this model with strong state intervention, low professionalization, and a history of polarization (Hallin & Mancini 2004: 67-8) represented the perfect target for a populist critique of mainstream media. Somewhat counterintuitively, though, the most liberalized media market, the Anglo-Atlantic type, while the least welcoming to populists in general, is the only type with precisely no outsider leaders. In Eastern Europe, meanwhile, although all types are overrepresented in the outsider group, the one that is most so is type F (the Eastern model of Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria): all the countries of this type have at least one outsider populist leader. Given the characteristics of this type, namely the smallest investments and audience for public broadcasting, the lowest levels of press freedom, and high foreign ownership of media, we are driven to conclude that media systems affect the chances for success of populist political outsiders in different ways in Western and Eastern Europe. Therefore, the evidence for t’Hart et al.’s hypothesis (2) is mixed.
b. Types of populist leaders

Our second order of considerations attempts to produce a taxonomy of populist-party leadership models based on an extrapolation from clustering in our data along the axes of electoral success, government participation, leadership length, and ideological orientation. We contend that contemporary European populist leaders can be grouped into five ideal-typical models. Table 1 summarizes them by organizing all the cases spatially along two dimensions, length of leadership (decreasing top to bottom) and access to governmental power (decreasing left to right).

The first group can be labeled ‘long-term marginals.’ These parties are never in government, have extremist ideologies, a very long term leadership, and typically hail from countries with a competitive national market for populist parties. Examples are Nikolaos Michaloliakos of Golden Dawn (Greece), Daniel Féret of the Belgian National Front, or Rudolf Keller of the Swiss Democrats. As a slightly divergent subgroup, we can identify a distinct Nordic model, with slightly better electoral results, occasional participation in government (but not leadership of it), and typically a monopoly of the national market for populism (e.g. Pia Kjærsgaard of Denmark or Carl Hagen of Norway).

The second group is labeled ‘East European headmen,’ and is characterized by strong electoral success, 1st party rank, leadership in government, and typically medium-length leadership, in the 10-to-20-year range (for example: Jarosław Kaczyński or Robert Fico). A subset of ‘survivors’ shares such qualities, while exhibiting even longer leadership careers (Viktor Orban being the classic case, to which Western politicians such as Silvio Berlusconi and Christoph Blocher may be assimilated).
### Table 1: Types of Populist Leadership

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<th>Prime Minister</th>
<th>In government</th>
<th>In opposition</th>
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<td><strong>Long to medium leadership</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Survivors</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Long-term Marginals</strong></td>
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<td>Blocher</td>
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<td>Berlusconi*</td>
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<td>Mečiar, Orban*</td>
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<td>Jelinčič*</td>
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<td><strong>East European Headmen</strong></td>
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<td>Féret, Bignasco</td>
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<td>Fico*</td>
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<td>Borisov*</td>
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<td><strong>Dealmakers</strong></td>
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<td>Uspaskich*</td>
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<td>Haider</td>
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<td><strong>Executives</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Meteors</strong></td>
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<td>Repše, Babiš*</td>
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<td>Grillo, Farage</td>
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<td>Parts</td>
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<td>Vanhecke, Le Pen*</td>
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<td><strong>Managers</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Grillo, Farage</strong></td>
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<td>Kammenos*</td>
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<td>Salvini*</td>
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<td><strong>Short leadership</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Meteors</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Managers</strong></td>
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<td>Szél*</td>
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<td>Lesar, Meloni*</td>
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<td>Stronach, Kukiz*</td>
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**Notes:**
*italics* = outsider politicians; * = ongoing leadership; # = external support to government.
The third group is that of the ‘dealmakers,’ long-term leaders who control sizeable reservoirs of votes and regularly participate in government as junior partners (examples include Joerg Haider and Andrzej Lepper).

Among populists who have participated in government, the dealmakers and the headmen can be contrasted with a fourth group, the ‘managers,’ who have significantly shorter leadership tenures. Typical cases are Rolandas Paksas in Lithuania or Joseph Bucher of the Austrian BZÖ. A subset of this fourth group (‘executives’) has achieved even greater success, leading governments, as in the case of Andrej Babiš in the Czech Republic or Juhan Parts in Estonia.

Finally, a group of ‘meteors,’ can be identified, in which short leadership and mediocre electoral success are matched with opposition status in parliament (e.g. Frank Stronach, Dan Diaconescu).

Among the leaders who do not fit easily within these categories, none have entered government. Many of these outliers have obtained significant electoral results (>10%) but their success is not correlated with their leadership tenure, as many have not enjoyed careers longer than a decade.

The chief advantage of the proposed taxonomy is that, while based on objective electoral, governmental, and biographical data, it also closely tracks distinctive leadership and communication styles. Moreover, it significantly distinguishes between the overall population of populist leaders and the subset of outsider leaders previously discussed. While the latter represent about 35% of the populist leader population as a whole, their distribution among the leader groups is significantly skewed: they comprise only 9% of the long-term marginals group (one single case, that of Giuliano Bignasca of the Swiss Lega dei Ticinesi) and are under-represented among the headmen, but they are slightly over-
represented among the meteors (38%) and most notably are a disproportionate amount—a full 50%—of the managers group (while being roughly proportional in the outlier group).

Thus, an empirical tendency in the political participation of outsider figures in the leadership of populist parties seems to emerge from the data. The two most characteristic options for outsider leadership appear to belong to the manager and meteor group: therefore, in order to explore these options more in depth, a representative case of each will be discussed as a pole of a continuum along which outsider leadership most often manifests itself.

5. Case studies

a. Representative cases²

i. Manager/Executive: Andrej Babiš

The Czech Republic, the country that over the past half-decade has witnessed the striking rise to power of Andrej Babiš and his outsider party ANO, presents the typical characteristics of weak institutionalization of the party system that facilitate the rise of populism. It has one of the lowest scores in our sample of trust in parliament as measured by Eurobarometer (12%), and an above-average DEREX anti-establishment attitudes score. Moreover, net satisfaction with democracy declined between 2004 and 2010. Despite a relatively mild influence of the international financial crisis on national economic growth, the party system was upended in the 2013 election, and the disruption was compounded in the following election of 2017. This was chiefly due to the allegations of corruption tainting the largest establishment parties, the mainstream-left Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD)

² Much of the reconstruction of these two case studies relies on Heinish & Saxonberg (2017).
and the center-right ODS, who had between them always led governments and provided Prime Ministers ever since the Velvet Revolution.

Andrej Babiš, a very successful businessman of Slovak origins who won his fortune by creating an agribusiness conglomerate (Agrofert) out of the privatization of State assets during the transition to capitalism, founded a party (ANO, which is the Czech word for “yes” as well as an acronym for “Action of dissatisfied citizens”) at the height of the anti-political mobilization of Czech civil society against the political class (Havlík and Voda 2016: 125, Brunclík and Kubát 2016: n29). The centrality of the fight against corruption to the party is borne out by the Manifesto project data. Beyond that, the party has a fluid ideological profile (its R-L parlgov score of 6 places it among mainstream European liberals, congruently with its joining the ALDE group in the European Parliament, while the Manifesto project RiLe would seem to suggest a slightly left-of-center slant). At first, the party banked on the outsider image of its leader, deploying a fairly pragmatic attitude towards topics that are heavily ideological elsewhere in the region, such as Euroskepticism, relations with Russia, or the refugee crisis.

Babiš’s leadership itself displays the characteristics of the ‘manager’/’executive’ group, as described above. In 2017, ANO improved on its already impressive score of 2013 by becoming the first party in the country, with more than twice the votes (29%) than its nearest competitor. As a consequence, Babiš was nominated Prime Minister (although his attempts to form a minority government have not, at the time of writing, been crowned with success). His political career, however, has so far been comparatively short, well under a decade. If Babiš proved capable of consolidating his position, he might be on the way to

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3 Indeed, the second-richest individual in the country, according to Forbes (https://www.forbes.com/billionaires/list/).
institutionalizing his role within the political system in the manner of the ‘East-European headman’ group. On the other hand, he could fall victim to the phenomenon of populist party churn.

Babiš’s successful entry into politics was predicated on an interesting balance of organizational and communication strategies.

From the point of view of party structure, ANO managed to guarantee cohesion and discipline mainly through its recruitment strategy. While some of its candidates had previous political experience, especially at the municipal level, and some civil society figures were persuaded to join the ranks of the party, the strategic positions within the organization were controlled by managers transferred from Babiš’s business concerns (Hloušek and Kopeček 2017, Cirhan and Kopecký 2017: 132-5). Hence, party institutionalization was underwritten by pre-political, business-firm loyalty ties, in what might be termed the ‘Fininvest model,’ after Berlusconi’s holding company.

In terms of communication strategy, it should first of all be noted that, two years after the founding of ANO, Agrofert acquired the media holding Mafra, which controls inter alia the storied and prestigious newspaper *Lidové noviny*, one of the largest-circulation popular dailies, *MF DNES*, as well as the most-visited internet news portal in Czech, iDNES. Although such outlets have not been employed for crude propaganda purposes, they guaranteed an at least equitable coverage of news regarding ANO and its leader. In parallel, Babiš launched a series of weekly interviews, carried on the Web, either in the form of monologues or as conversations with scripted, softball questions. This protracted media exposure allowed him to frame a public persona removed from the perceived verbiage and duplicitousness of the political class: a mixture of business authoritativeness (Cirhan and Kopecký 2017) and outsider common-sense fused in the mold of a national trope, the traditional Czech
everyman. Such a public reputation was solidified with savvy publicity blitzes, such as running pop-up soup kitchens in busy thoroughfares. By such means, Babiš was capable of maintaining his outsider, populist credibility even while participating as a junior partner in government. The preservation of an aura of authenticity was all the more remarkable, considering the numerous allegations of conflict of interest and corruption levelled at Babiš himself, which, his detractors claim, represented the real motive behind his political engagement in the first place. Whether the balancing act is compatible with the occupation of the Prime Ministership is perhaps the most crucial question for Babiš’s future political prospects.

ii. Meteor: Frank Stronach

The underlying characteristics of public opinion in Austria set the country apart from its Czech neighbor. For instance, trust in parliament, at 64%, is one of the highest in our sample, on a par with Scandinavian countries. Similarly, the DEREX Anti-establishment attitudes index is much lower (14) than average. Moreover, net satisfaction with democracy, as measured by Eurobarometer, actually increased in the period 2004-10. Such structural conditions notwithstanding, Austria also underwent a ‘change’ election in 2013 fuelled by dissatisfaction with the status quo, witnessing the emergence of a series of new parties, chief among which Team Stronach.

Frank Stronach, an Austrian immigrant to Canada after the Second World War and self-made billionaire in the auto parts industry, had already dabbled with electoral politics in his adopted country in the late 1980s. However, at the beginning of the present decade he made his country of birth the target of his political ambitions. The Austrian political scene had already been destabilized around the turn of the century, as the rise of the FPOE had
successfully challenged the cozy duopoly of Social Democrats and Christian Democrats that had dominated the country in the postwar period. However, according to Stronach a political space within the ideological spectrum still remained underrepresented: classical laissez-faire liberalism. Stronach therefore wished to challenge the status quo in economic matters, while not necessarily endorsing the social conservatism of the FPOE. Such a position is reflected in the quantitative data: if the R-L parlgov score is the same as ANO’s, the Manifesto project RiLe of 0.971 is much more moderate. In terms of the other issues we tracked through the Manifesto project data, while corruption was the chief concern for Team Stronach as well, the party was also Euroskeptic (the EU being accused of corporatism and business-stifling red tape), as well as outspoken about immigration.

Stronach’s leadership epitomizes the characteristics of the meteor group. He led his party for only 4 years. His general election score of 2013 (5.7%), while quite remarkable for a new party, did not offer any chance of entering the executive branch. His abandonment of the leadership role triggered a quick organizational collapse, such that the party dissolved prior to the subsequent elections, consigning it to posterity as a flash phenomenon, a one-term wonder. Ultimately, given the relatively late phase within his life-cycle of Stronach’s political engagement, combined with the multiplicity of other business and social activities outside of the country, he lacked credibility in his commitment to the political sphere in the medium run (Austrian electoral study 2014: 35, Austrian electoral study 2015: 28).

This outcome was in part facilitated by a particular equilibrium of organizational and communication strategy decisions.

Team Stronach was initially constituted as a parliamentary group in 2012, the year before the elections, through the defection of a handful of MPs originally elected with the Social Democrats and Haider’s BZOE (Dolezal and Zeglovits 2014: 645). This tactic allowed
the party to side-step the requirement for new political forces to collect large numbers of citizen signatures in order to be placed on the ballot. However, the recycling of political personnel left Team Stronach with a permanently lukewarm loyalty amongst its cadres, who sought individual escape routes for their political careers once it became clear that the leader was abandoning active engagement (Austrian electoral study 2013: 28).

With regards to communication strategy, Team Stronach represented an attempt to apply the principles of North-American political advertising to a Continental European audience in an unmediated fashion. The results were mixed. The party certainly relied on its leader’s charisma (Schlögl and Maireder 2014), to the exclusion of most other means, and when it did not, as in the notorious case of its attempt at viral marketing, the hip-hop campaign song its MPs were induced to film, it arguably did not serve its best interests. The party focused heavily on the ‘air war’ of television presence over the ‘ground war’ of retail politics. Frank Stronach embodied the populist persona, especially in his pugnacious relation with the mainstream media. A part of his appeal and claim to authenticity depended on adversarial behavior aimed to shake the citizenry from its status quo-induced torpor. His disruptive participation in TV shows generated attention, but it cannot be said that it meaningfully advanced the conversation or swayed public opinion in favor of the party’s ideological positions, for instance in terms of orthodox economic liberalism. Furthermore, certain characteristics of the candidate, such as his strong anglophone accent in German, stood in the way of symbolic representation of, and unmediated contact with, the people. Ultimately, and perhaps against the plans and expectations of his communication team, Stronach was cast into the public role of the kantankerous uncle, whose verbal extremism is essentially neutralized by a likeable, avuncular style. In conclusion, Stronach was able to
maintain his outsider credentials and defend his authenticity, but at the price of failing to attain any real influence on the political decision-making process in Austria.

b. Outlier case: Beppe Grillo

Grillo is in many ways an astonishing case, an outlier in the group of outsiders-turned-politicians we have studied, chiefly in that he declines to run directly for office. In this sense, he fits our title’s description of kingmaker, preferring to ‘inspire’ his party from outside the institutions, while retaining a very real power over strategic decision-making. The party he founded in 2009—the Five-Star Movement (Movimento Cinque Stelle, M5S)—was the clear winner of the 2018 Italian general election, with almost a third of the valid votes (32.7%). Our data allow us to examine Grillo’s numerous other peculiarities, which are also affected by long-term systemic factors at the national level.

As table 2 shows, in the last 25 years Italy is the only country with as many as three elections in the list of most ‘volatile’ elections in Western Europe since 1945 (with levels above 25). The Italian party system has never recovered from the breakdown experienced in 1992-93 during the Tangentopoli judicial investigations, which brought about the leadership of Silvio Berlusconi.

Layers of discontent in the political system, punctuated by the periodic outburst of anti-establishment movements, have accumulated over time, peaking in 2018 with populist parties (including the Lega, led by Matteo Salvini (17.4%), and Brothers of Italy (4.4%)) surpassing the 50 percent threshold and holding a majority of seats in parliament.4 Related to the de-structuring of the Italian party system is the long-term popular dissatisfaction with

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4 Indeed, the cumulative party system innovation value in Emanuele & Chiaramonte’s data was the highest in the sample, almost double the average for Western Europe.
the working of democracy, combined with strong anti-party sentiments. When compared to other West European countries that voted in 2017 (Germany, France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Austria), Italy shows an unparalleled electoral salience of issues such as corruption and the costs of politics.\(^5\) Eurobarometer data on trust in parliament (12%) and the index of anti-establishment attitudes (33) are comparable with the Czech Republic.

Table 2: The Most Volatile Elections in Western Europe (1945-2018)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total volatility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>48.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>43.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>40.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>39.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>36.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>35.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>34.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>31.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>29.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>27.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>26.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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Grillo’s success lies in channeling this dissatisfaction by—in his own words—acting like a ‘megaphone’ for the citizen, oppressed by the greed of the political class. Grillo first came to public notoriety as a comedian, and his shows appeared for a time on a television channel belonging to Berlusconi; after a very public falling out, Berlusconi black-balled him from television. As a consequence, Grillo turned his attention to live shows, which grew increasingly into a form of civic activism. His first real breakthrough came in 2007, when he organized a “V-day” (i.e. a ‘F_\_k-off day’) in Bologna, for citizens to vent their angst at the status quo. That same year, *La Casta*, a journalistic exposé co-authored by Sergio Rizzo and Gian Antonio Stella on the privileges of the political class, was, with over 1 million copies sold, the Italian-language best-seller. Within this milieu of general dissatisfaction, the M5S was born.

In general, Grillo’s personal attitudes towards media are marked by a significant ambivalence (Cosenza 2014): he has long been refusing TV interviews as part of his crusade against the establishment, but has often made himself available to foreign press and TV. For several years, M5S MPs were ordered not to appear on TV without specific permission. This ambivalence towards the media mirrors Grillo’s ambivalent role: the leader and true inspirer of a political movement that still commands significant popular confidence in opinion polls, but who has apparently taken a decisive step back from personal involvement.

In a context dominated by an increasing distrust towards politics, and given the ultimate aim of getting rid of the political establishment as a whole, Gerbaudo has a point in referring to the ‘generic internet user’ as the ‘new common man’ (2014). Rhetorically, ‘horizontalism’ as the basic element of this new politics finds a clear expression in M5S MPs’ refusal to use the ‘honourable member’ title in favour of that of ‘citizen.’ In the same vein, Grillo defines himself not as the Head of the Movement, but rather as its ‘megaphone’—in sharp contrast
to his authoritarian assertion of internal discipline, which led to the expulsion of more than 20 MPs in the first two years of the past parliament, i.e. over 15 percent of the parliamentary party.

In tracing the organizational evolution of the party, Tronconi (2018) refers to an ‘elusive organizational model.’ In order to implement the core goal of horizontalism and the primacy of the Web, the ROUSSEAU platform was created in 2016 to coordinate the Movement’s activities and conduct what it considers politically-binding consultations with its base. However, ROUSSEAU is a peculiar instantiation of online democracy, being a one-way tool that allows for no feedback. While certain blog-posts can receive several thousand comments, there is never a reply by the author. Horizontalism and ‘citizenism’ are represented in the blog mainly in that most of the topics analysed are framed along an attempt to defend citizen rights, and more specifically the ‘common man.’ This consistently repeated anti-political rhetoric persists a half-decade after the movement first entered the Italian parliament.

The party is now living through a phase of institutionalization and ‘normalisation’ (Corbetta 2017; Tronconi 2018). In this respect, the emergence of a new leadership, with Luigi Di Maio contesting the 2018 general election as a ‘premier-candidate,’ while significant, should not lead us to conclude that Grillo has lost all influence on his project. Only time will tell whether the decision to promote Di Maio as day-to-day coordinator will make a significant difference for the peculiar combination of horizontal ideology and vertical leadership of the M5S.

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6 In inverted commas here, as there is no formal direct election of Prime Ministers in Italy. However, the fact itself that ever since 2001 parties and coalitions have developed the habit of indicating their preferred choice for the role (either in the form of ‘premier’ or ‘presidente’) in their official name on the ballot testifies to the progressive personalization of the Italian political system.
This freedom from responsibility is also a freedom of movement: it allows Grillo to combine his use of on-stage performances around the country (veritable one-man shows, as in the so-called ‘Tsunami tour’ on the eve of the 2013 election), with ‘each one counts as one’ (‘uno vale uno’) as its most distinctive motto and recruiting slogan on the Web. Grillo’s capacity to show spontaneity is facilitated by his position: not running for a representative office he has a less stringent need to show he is ‘one of us’. Grillo does not need to be a coherent leader, and he could candidly accept the definition of populist addressed to him by professional politicians. Indeed, Grillo is a self-proclaimed qualunquista, an expression which comes from the Movement of the ‘Common Man’ (Uomo Qualunque), an anti-establishment flash party from the early postwar years, which was very successful in Southern Italy and later was a source of inspiration for poujadisme in France.\footnote{Poujadisme defended the ‘France d’en bas’ or ‘les petits’ against ‘Le Gros’ (Shields 2007), the everyday man against the elitist politician. In this respect, a parallel between Grillo and the French comedian Coluche (whose early bid for the 1981 Presidential election had been sponsored by eminent public intellectuals such as Pierre Bourdieu, Alain Touraine, and Gilles Deleuze) has been proposed by several authors (Biorcio 2013; Vignati 2015).}

This admission on qualunquismo is consistent with a marketing technique (see again Wood et al. 2016) marked by Grillo’s ambivalent combination of informal leadership of the Movement and the preservation of styles and attitudes typical of his job as a comedian. Hence ‘swear words, insults, rude gestures, caustic jokes, contradictions, and continuous coups de theatre’ form his normal repertoire (Cosenza 2014, 90). A quotation from Cosenza (2014) defines the extent to which Grillo’s marketing technique differs from that of the traditional politicians.

Not only does Grillo say ‘I’m one of you’, as many politicians do, but, by using the Italian tu continuously, he addresses the other person on equal terms (‘I am like you’), to such an extent that he almost ends up identifying with them, as though he wanted to give voice to what the other person would say, to form a whole
and fuse with each of us (‘I am you’). Besides this repetitive use of the singular pronoun tu, Grillo’s complete, almost physical fusion with his audience depends on his extreme body language: he is not content with looking at his interlocutors, but if there are just a few he gets very close to them, touching and hugging them; whereas when he is on stage in front of thousands of people, he always leans forward as if he wanted to fling himself into the crowd.

In sum, Grillo’s celebrity is a very peculiar one. His communication strategy is built on his ambiguous combination of a never-abandoned comedic persona, the fusion with his public-turned-electorate, and his role as a maverick and castigator of the vices of the political class. While it will be difficult for the M5S to become institutionalised until Grillo leaves the scene, those who predicted the Movement’s demise – much like those who did the same 20 years earlier for Forza Italia – have been disproven by events.

6. Conclusion

In the foregoing pages, we have endeavored to show how outsider and celebrity dynamics shape the leadership of populist political parties in Europe. On the basis of a dataset of 65 populist leaders in 28 EEA countries, we have discussed the characteristics (status as party founders, geographical concentration, competitiveness of the populist ecosystem, length of leadership) that set outsider leaders apart. Perhaps most importantly, we have found empirical corroboration for research hypotheses proposed in the secondary literature, according to which low levels of systemic trust and a destabilization of the political system favor the successful entry of outsider, celebrity politicians in the electoral arena, and the tenure of celebrity politicians is shorter ceteris paribus than the career of their professional counterparts. Evidence for a third hypothesis, relating to the role of the
‘tabloidization’ of the media system in the emergence of celebrity politicians, was inconclusive. Future research on populist celebrities with more granular data on the determinants of the media sphere would be very welcome.

Furthermore, we proposed an inductive taxonomy of populist leadership types, based on infra-organizational and broader political measures of success, and have observed that outsider politicians tend to cluster in some leadership types rather than others. On this basis, we have examined two representative cases (Andrej Babiš and Frank Stronach) of outsider populist leadership, and for each we have discussed the interplay of organizational, ideological, and communication strategy variables in their bid to leverage their outsider credentials for political advantage. Finally, we have considered an outlier case, that of Beppe Grillo, completely unique along the organizational, ideological, and communication dimensions.

 Outsider, celebrity politicians are increasingly not simple jesters, brought in by political professionals for propaganda purposes. They can be kings in their own right, and in contemporary populist political movements across Europe they have in many ways found a profoundly congenial ideological and discursive environment. But the possibility exists for a third option, which optimally preserves perceived authenticity of character while maximizing political influence: whether the role of a celebrity populist kingmaker will remain an Italian anomaly or whether it has the potential to attract epigones elsewhere is a question with significant implications for the future spread of populism and the nature of its leadership.
Appendix: data description

We have gathered information on populist parties in European Economic Area (EEA) countries (i.e. EU-28 plus EFTA-3), as coded by various scholarly overviews (Moffitt 2016, Stanley 2017, Rupnik 2016, van Kessel 2015). There were no populist parties reported in Malta, Cyprus, and Portugal, bringing the country total to 28. The parties were selected for having obtained parliamentary representation in at least one election during the two decades of focus of the study (1999-2018): this gives us an n=66.

For each party (after mentioning if it is still a going concern in 2018) we list the span of years in which it was represented in parliament, its best electoral result in a general election, in terms both of vote share and party rank, and its participation in government, on an ordinal scale with 0=opposition, 1=external support, 2=participation, and 3=leadership of government (parlgov.org data).

We then select for each party one leadership figure (with the exception of one Icelandic party that was governed by a directoire). The choice of such a personality obviously involves a non-zero element of discretion on the part of the observer: in a few rare cases the same politician may have led two different parties (e.g. Joerg Haider), in a few others the politician selected was not the formal leader of the national party (e.g. Christoph Blocher); we are convinced, however, that in the overwhelming majority of cases the chosen politician uncontroversially represents the most important actor within the party in the period of focus of the study. Of these 65 cases, we list whether the politician founded the party, when the leadership occurred and how long it lasted, and whether it is still ongoing.

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8 See replication material for full dataset.
Furthermore, we identify a subset of cases where the politician in question had resources of notoriety/visibility outside of political life: this yields a group of 23 leaders with outsider (pre-political) credentials, or roughly a third of the total; the origin of such social capital is generically identified.

Next, we describe party ideology. We present the party’s L-R index (from 1 for extreme Left-wing parties to 10 for extreme Right-wing parties) reported in parlgov.org; as an alternative, we present the latest RiLe index for the party from the Manifesto Project (which assumes a negative value for Left, positive for Right). Further evidence on ideological orientation is derived by other data in the Manifesto Project, namely Euroscepticism (Manifesto Project EU: negative [per 110]), anti-corruption animus (Manifesto Project Political corruption [per 304]), anti-finance animus (Manifesto Project Foreign financial influence [per 103.2]), and anti-immigrant animus (Manifesto Project Immigration: negative [per 601.2]). All these indices measure the extent to which such topics recur in the party’s electoral manifesto for a given election, and for each party the data refer to the latest election for which the Manifesto Project has data on them.

As a measure of party organization, we have a dummy variable reflecting whether the party is a new party in the time-frame of the study, according to the criteria set forth by Emanuele and Chiaramonte.

As a measure of the institutional ‘temperature’ in the country, we use the index of anti-establishment attitudes present in the DEREX database, itself developed on the basis of the European Social Survey. For each party, the data-point immediately preceding the accession of the leader is chosen; failing that, the data point immediately preceding the obtaining of parliamentary representation; as a residual rule, the earliest data point within the period in which the party sat in parliament. For the same year, we also present three indicators of
trust (in political parties, the national parliament, and the national government) drawn from
the Eurobarometer survey data for that country. Furthermore, to present a more diachronic
picture of Eurobarometer data, we show the value of the net satisfaction with democracy at
four time points (1973, when Eurobarometer surveys began, 1999, the beginning of our
period of study, 2004, the date of the Eastern EU Enlargement, and 2010, as a conventional

In terms of the national media system, we report a classification based on Hallin &
Mancini (2004), as expanded by Castro Herrero et al. (2017) to Central and Eastern Europe:
six different typologies (A through F) of media systems are identified, based on
characteristics of market concentration, lowbrow-highbrow balance of readership, and so
forth.

Finally, party system innovation is measured, following Emanuele & Chiaramonte (2016)
data, in two ways: Cumulative party system innovation in the last election held in each
country and Variation in the cumulative party system innovation since 2010.
References


Herrero, Laia Castro, Edda Humprecht, Sven Engesser, Michael Brüggemann, and Florin Büchel. “Rethinking Hallin and Mancini Beyond the West: An Analysis of Media


The results come as populist and right-wing parties' support across the EU grows. Voters in the European Union are opting for right-wing populist parties due to a fear of globalization, a study by Germany’s renowned Bertelsmann Stiftung has found. The results come as populist and right-wing parties’ support across the EU grows. Authors of the research, entitled “Globalization anxiety or value conflict? Who in Europe votes for the populist parties and why?” examined the opinions of nearly 11,000 people in all 28 EU countries. According to a key finding of the paper, globalization appears to be the crucial force behind the growing ranks of right-wing and populist parties’ acr