Chapter 6

Archaeological Resource Management Under Franco’s Spain

The Comisaría General de Excavaciones Arqueológicas

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In the context of a European continent increasingly dominated by right-wing totalitarian regimes, the Spanish Civil War (1936–39) led to the beginning of the long dictatorship of General Francisco Franco (1936/39–1975). The effects of this political change were apparent in all areas, including archaeology. As we have discussed elsewhere (Díaz-Andreu, 1993; Díaz-Andreu, 1997c; Ramírez Sánchez, 2000), one of the spheres in which the Francoist regime had an impact was that of heritage administration. It is on this issue that this article will focus. We will explain some of the changes the administration of heritage went through and the consequences thereof. In particular, we will center our discussion on the service which administered archaeological fieldwork during the first period of the Francoist regime, the General Commissariat for Archaeological Excavations (CGEA, Comisaría General de Excavaciones Arqueológicas).

Franco’s dictatorship lasted for about 36 years, from 1936/39 until 1975. That was too long a period for a regime to remain homogenous. In order to survive during the years examined in this article, mainly the 1940s and 1950s, the regime had
to react and reshape in accordance with the events set in train by the Second World War and the Cold War. As a consequence, several phases of development can be distinguished. 1936/39–1943 has been labelled as the fascistic or semi-fascistic phase (Smith, 1996:169). Franco's admiration for the fascist regimes of Germany and Italy led him to adopt a very positive attitude towards the Axis. However, already in 1943–44, he understood the need to take a more neutral stance. The fascist elements within his regime were downplayed whereas the anti-communist and pro-Catholic components were highlighted. The result was a lessening importance of the Falangists counterbalanced by the increasing power of the Catholic groups, especially the Opus Dei.2

Power within the administration of archaeological heritage followed a similar pattern to that highlighted for Spanish politics, although with some time lag. In 1939 the organization of archaeological heritage was left in the hands of a Falangist, Julio Martínez Santa-Olalla (figure 6.1). He put in place a structure which would endure until the mid-fifties. In 1955, however, a sort of coup was planned by seven professors. They sent a letter to the new Minister of Education, Joaquín Ruiz Giménez, a minister no longer associated with the Falangists but with the backing of the Catholics within the regime (Smith, 1996:312). As a consequence, the CGEA was abolished and instead another administrative service, the National Service for Archaeological Excavations (SNEA—Servicio Nacional de Excavaciones Arqueológicas), was created. The formation of the SNEA, however, did not result in major organizational overhaul. Provincial and local commissars would remain in post, for a transitional period whose length was not specified. However, Ruiz Giménez's fall in 1956 resulted in the transitional period enduring well until the mid 1960s, when eventually the changes went fully ahead.

In this article we will explain the organization of archaeological heritage administration in Spain during the right-wing dictatorship of General Francisco Franco (1936/39–1975). In particular we will assess the functioning of the CGEA in the 1940s and 1950s as an example of the interaction between archaeology and politics within the context of a totalitarian regime. The work by Junker (1998) on archaeological institutions in Germany during the 1930s will be used to help assess what elements may have influenced the divergent developments observed in that country in comparison with Spain. One such development, we will argue, concerns the personalities of the main actors and their willingness to maintain scientific advancement and support innovation or, on the contrary, stifle advancement for fear of being surpassed by other colleagues. The result may be either an archaeology that endures such adversity relatively unharmed—as seems to have been the case of the German Archaeological Institute (Junker, 1998)—or, on the contrary, one that suffers a period of rapid decline, as happened in Spain. Yet, a comparison with the Spanish situation before Franco's dictatorship shows that circumstances were not that different in both periods. We will contend, however, that an improvement should have occurred in particular throughout the fascist
period: There should have been a gradual replacement of non-professional by professional archaeologists, and archaeological institutions should have been led by the most prestigious academics, rather than by people who knew little about archaeology but whose political allegiance to the regime proved to be convenient to the government. Finally, the assessment of the CGEA may be used as an example of the heterogeneous nature of nationalist movements, an issue discussed in more detail elsewhere (Díaz-Andreu, 1997b).

1. AIMS AND BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE CGEA

The General Commissariat for Archaeological Excavations (CGEA—Comisaria General de Excavaciones Arqueológicas) was created on 9 March 1939,
a few days before the end of the Civil War (1936–39). It was subordinate to the Service for the Defence of National Artistic Heritage (SDPAN—Servicio de Defensa del Patrimonio Artístico Nacional). The aim of the SDPAN was “to reorganize the protection of the national artistic heritage and protect it from the events of war, the destructive fury and the acquisitive improvision of mobs, governments and other forms of pillage seen during the red resistance” (BOE [Boletín Oficial del Estado] 12.8.1938). In turn, the function of the CGEA was to administer, inspect and interpret archaeological excavations (decree 9.3.1939). In a different decree passed a year later, on 17 October 1940, and signed by General Franco himself, CGEA's role was more narrowly defined as to “elaborate the overall plans of excavations and oversee them.” During the sixteen years it lasted (1939–1955), the Commissariat represented the highest administrative body for archaeological heritage.

The CGEA came to fulfil the role that from 1912 had been played by the Higher Council for Excavations and Antiquities (JSEA—Junta Superior de Excavaciones y Antigüedades), called from 1933, the Council for the Artistic Treasure (JTA—Junta del Tesoro Artístico; Diaz-Andreu, 1997a). However, it differed from its pre-war predecessors in two of its main features. The first was the new emphasis on centralization and direction from Madrid. The previous decentralization of power to areas such as Catalonia was completely abolished. Traditional regions were only partially respected through the creation of provincial commissars. The second main difference regarding the previous period was the politicization of the main people in charge in order, as the decree explained, “to guarantee their support for the ‘National Cause.”

The CGEA broadly adopted the structure of the Service for the Defence of National Artistic Heritage (SDPAN). A General Commissar assisted by a Vice-General Commissar were in charge of the SDPAN. They had to be members of the FET y de las JONS (see note 2). Instead of provincial and local commissars, the SDPAN had nine zone commissars who were nominated by the General Director of Fine Arts (Director General de Bellas Artes) in agreement with the military powers in the area (the document had to be signed by a lieutenant or above), and finally approved by the Ministry of National Education. In contrast with the SDPAN, because the CGEA was—practically—a post-war institution, the power of the army was greatly reduced. Political allegiance, however, still had an important role in the selection of its members. Membership in the Falange was encouraged, and no individuals who had fought for the Republican government in the Civil War were theoretically allowed. However, the promotion of individuals like Emeterio Cuadrado Diaz, who had been on the Republican side and who was almost shot by firing squad after the Civil War (Cuadrado, pers. comm. to MDA, 8.1983), shows that the rules were sometimes relaxed (Cuadrado was made local commissar of Cartagena on 28.9.1944).
2. THE PERSONNEL OF THE CGEA IN THE MAIN OFFICE

As in the SDPAN, a General Commissar was in charge of the CGEA and was assisted by a Vice-General Commissar. In contrast to the SDPAN, however, there were no zone commissars. Instead, in April 1941, the creation of provincial and local commissars was approved.

At the CGEA's inception in March 1939, Julio Martínez Santa-Olalla was General Commissar. He stayed in post until the CGEA was abolished in 1955, and then became the head of the National Service for Archaeological Excavations (SNEA) for another two years (Enciclopedia, 1908–210). Martínez Santa-Olalla (1905–1972) had been an outstanding student. After graduation, from 1927 until 1931, he had been a Spanish language instructor in Bonn (Germany) (Enciclopedia, 1908–210), and later, beginning in 1935, he had lectured at the University of Madrid (San Valero, 1978). He gained the chair at the University of Santiago de Compostela in March 1936, a few months before the beginning of the Civil War (Escalafón, 1964). He did not spend much time in Santiago. When the War started in July 1936, he returned to Madrid, a town which remained loyal to the Republic during the entire Civil War. As a member of the Falange from its early days (he was an “old shirt”—camisa vieja—i.e. one of the early members of the Falange; MC, SJS, 75, 4, 1), Martínez Santa-Olalla had to seek refuge in the French embassy for a period of time before having to abandon Madrid (MC, SJS, 75, 4, 1). He was not the only right-winger in his family. His father, General Martínez Herrera, was a high ranking military official in the close circle of Franco (Castelo Ruano et al., 1995:15). His family endured some retaliations in the Republican zone, and as a result a brother of his was killed (Martínez Santa-Olalla, 1946a: 1).

Julio Martínez Santa-Olalla was a protégé of Juan Contreras, the Marquis of Lozoya, who was the head of the Service for the Defence of National Artistic Heritage to which the CGEA was subordinate during its first period. All this put him in an ideal position to apply for the key posts in the organization of Spanish archaeology. Not only did he obtain the principal position within the CGEA, but he also taught in the University of Madrid in the so-called Chair in Primitive History of Man left vacant by Hugo Obermaier. He was also the director of the Spanish Society of Anthropology, Ethnography and Prehistory (Sociedad Española de Antropología, Etnografía y Prehistoria), and as the head of all these institutions, he controlled a large number of publications. In 1940 he was made the head of the Section of Iron Age and Roman Archaeology of the Higher Council for Scientific Research (CSIC—Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas). However, his ambition (see below) and most probably the CSIC's political allegiance to the Opus Dei and not to the Falange (see note 2), resulted in him not being welcome. His connection to the CSIC seems to have been short (Olmos, 1993:48). In 1955 he moved to a chair in Zaragoza (at least theoretically) and in 1957 he moved to
a chair in Valencia (M. Baldó, pers. comm.), where his disciple, Julián San Valero, had also moved in 1950. He would only return to Madrid in 1965 (Enciclopedia, 1908:210). Although it may appear inconsistent, a close academic friendship between Martínez Santa-Olalla and Childe must be noted (Díaz-Andreu, 1998a).

Carlos Alonso del Real y Ramos (1914–1993) was given the post of Vice-General Commissar on 13 May 1939 (in fact, on 12 December 1940, when a mistake made regarding his surname was corrected). He had graduated in 1936, just before the Civil War started, and completed his doctorate in 1940. As a convinced Falangist (del Real y Ramos pers. comm. to MDA, 11.6.1992) he fought for Franco's Spain. Later, he formed part of the Blue Division. Back in Spain already in July of 1942 (AGA, 219, 4), he returned to duty as Vice-General Commissar (the absence of any documentation of the AGA regarding any substitution seems to imply that his post was left vacant during the interim period). His involvement with the CGEA may have come to an end in 1955, although we have been unable to find any information on this matter at the National Archive for the Administration. In 1955 he gained a chair at the University of Santiago de Compostela (Filip, 1966/69:122).

A bill sent in December 1940 and found in the documentation of the General Archive of the Administration (AGA 219, 12/25) informs us with respect to the CGEA's assistant personnel: two technicians (ayudantes y colaboradores técnicos), a secretary, a photographer and an ordenanza (a post which is half way between a porter and a secretary, at the time usually fulfilled by a man). Two of Julio Martínez Santa-Olalla's students, the women Clarisa Millán García and M. Luisa Herrera Escudero, were technicians. Both had finished their degrees before the Civil War (Díaz-Andreu, 1998b:130) and one of their fellow colleagues, María Luisa Oliveros Rives, interviewed by one of us (MDA) in November 1993, recalled that they had been helping Julio Martínez Santa-Olalla at the University. There was no mention of the CGEA. They would both eventually pass the examinations for the job of museum keeper at a national museum, María Luisa Herrera in 1942 and Clarisa Millán not much later. María Luisa Herrera was unofficially replaced in September 1942 by Julián San Valero Aparisi, and his position was made official in February 1946 (AGA, 219). In turn he left the post when he gained a chair at the University of Granada in 1948. He was replaced by Bernardo Sáez Martín, who served from April 1948 until 1962 (AGA 219, 12/25).

The appointment of women under a regime that theoretically discouraged them from working may not be as strange as it first seems. Both Clarisa Millán García and María Luisa Herrera Escudero were single. It was after marriage that women were totally dissuaded from working (Díaz-Andreu, 1998b:132). In addition, there may have been another factor that helped them. Julio Martínez Santa-Olalla was a homosexual within a regime with an explicit anti-homosexuality policy (a factor that would later be used by his enemies against him). He might have felt special sympathy for women—several women interviewed in 1993 gave
very positive accounts of him as against their comments about most of their other male colleagues. However, despite his positive attitude towards women as technicians, only eight were selected as provincial or local commissars in the entire history of the CGEA. In 1950, for example, among the 39 provincial commissars, only one was a woman, Joaquina Eguaras, the director of the Archaeological Museum of Granada (Actas..., 1951:85–90). This seems to indicate that fieldwork was still considered—even for Martínez Santa-Olalla—a man’s business, a way of thinking that he may have learned in his youth from his professor at the University of Madrid, Hugo Obermaier (Díaz-Andreu, 1998b:132). Both Clara Millán García and María Luisa Herrera Escudero—as well as Julián San Valero Aparisi—may have benefited from being under Martínez Santa-Olalla’s umbrella, given that the selection of candidates for permanent posts in museums and universities was— and still is— governed by a strong patronage system. Bernardo Sáez Martín, however, did not work as an archaeologist after his period of service to the CGEA ended in 1962. At that time Martínez Santa-Olalla’s popularity was low and this would have influenced his chances of getting a permanent job either at the university or in a museum. Nonetheless, this may not have been the reason why he never obtained a permanent job in archaeology. He had been more than a technician for Martínez Santa-Olalla, and their professional relationship probably ended at the same time that their personal relationship ended.

The members of the CGEA in the main office were the only ones who received a salary, as provincial and local commissars worked for free. However, matters do not seem to have gone smoothly in this respect. In July 1941 Julio Martínez Santa-Olalla wrote a letter to the General Direction of Fine Arts to remind him that Carlos Alonso del Real y Ramos had not been paid at all in two years at his post. As discussed elsewhere (Díaz-Andreu, 1997a), this lack of economic backing—both for people at the main office and for many others working throughout the country—probably reflected a certain disinterest in archaeology on the part of the Spanish dictatorship. One should not forget that Francoist Spain sought its national roots in the period after 1492, when, following the strategic marriage arrangements of the Catholic Monarchs—Isabella of Castille and Fernando of Aragon—and the expulsion of the Moors, the religious and territorial unity of Spain was established (Díaz-Andreu and Mora, 1995:34). All this meant that archaeology was not part of the main agenda in Francoist Spain. 1492 was also the year in which Columbus reached America for the first time, a “discovery” which would lead to the creation of the Spanish Empire. Yet, in the case of the CGEA the lack of economic backing for provincial and local commissars may also be explained by the particular way Julio Martínez Santa-Olalla expected the spirit of the heritage service to operate. He and his acolytes compared the commissars’ work with that undertaken by religious missionaries (Sánchez Jiménez, 1946) and heroes (Martínez Santa-Olalla, 1946b), i.e. by people whose nature was to sacrifice themselves for others without asking anything in return.
Seven individuals at an office in Madrid were clearly an insufficient number to control the archaeology of a country of almost six hundred thousand square kilometres. The lack of adequate personnel was resolved by the decree (orden) of 30 April 1941 by which the General Direction of Fine Arts—upon which the CGEA now depended—could start the recruitment of provincial and local commissars. Yet, in fact, as the documentation of the Museo Canario shows, in 1940 Julio Martínez Santa-Olalla was already building a network of unofficial collaborators in several provinces.

The system by which the candidates for such posts were selected does not appear to have been specified in any way. Documents from the National Archive for the Administration (AGA—Archivo General de la Administración), however, show that a confidential political report was requested of either the Civil Governorship, the provincial headquarters of the Falange, or others such as the Royal Academies. Most of these reports were routine, especially after 1950. Yet, sometimes the candidate's political past or—the fact of his having fought with the republicans during the Civil War were enough reason for him or her to be rejected. As an example, in 1941 Francisco Figueras Pacheco's candidature for provincial commissar of Alicante was discarded because the report from the Royal Academy of Fine Arts of San Fernando defined him as "not esteemed by or supportive of the regime" and referred to some events that occurred before the Civil War, characterizing the candidate as a left-winger. In order to confirm these data another report was requested from a member of the Falange with the same results. However, not all individuals with a left-wing pre-war past were discarded. If the report was favorable despite their background, as it was in Samuel de los Santos Gener's case in 1947, when he applied to be commissar of Córdoba, the post was granted. In contrast to the two previous cases, all fourteen candidates with reports indicating either membership in the Falange (i.e. to the FET y de las JONS, see note 2) or strong Catholic views were automatically accepted. The reports, however, did not give much or any importance to the candidates' training in archaeology. Martínez Santa-Olalla does not appear to have been interested in their knowledge of archaeology and indeed some candidates seem not to have been properly trained by today's standards, given that they had no more than an elementary school education. Professionalism, therefore, was not encouraged.

Neither was the selection of professionals—or at least archaeology students—encouraged in a memorandum sent by Martínez Santa-Olalla in 1946 to all provincial and local commissars, authorizing them to seek help from unpaid, so-called support helpers (MC, SJS, 61, 1, 8). The helpers would assist with surveys, excavations and laboratory work. However, no information about them is to be found.
in the National Archive for the Administration and therefore we are unable to say anything else about them.

The lack of professionalism on the part of provincial and local commissars is something that cannot simply be related to Martínez Santa-Olalla's wish to give archaeology back to the people. Neither can it exclusively be seen as a means by which he stopped other colleagues from invading his domain. However, we should note that the situation then was not so different from that of the first decades of the twentieth century. Both the JSEA and the JTA (see above) used to grant permissions for excavations to non-professionals, as shown by the number of unknown names—120 in contrast to 59 professional archaeologists—mentioned in the documentation of the JSEA (Díaz-Andreu, 1997a:410). As professor Alberto del Castillo (1899–1976) wrote in 1955 as regards the situation at that time:

Excavations were undertaken by amateurs without any training whatsoever, though full of enthusiasm and good will. The time of the 'local wise-men[women?] and of dilettantism was upon us. In all villages there was either a priest, a chemist or a doctor who enjoyed digging and studying, in their own particular way, the local past. ’ (Castillo, 1955:617)

Although in the 1940s and 1950s the number of professional archaeologists was still low, and many of them occupied posts in museums and universities, the lack of economic remuneration for provincial and local commissars did in fact make the provincial and local posts attractive mainly to individuals who earned their living by other means. In effect, real professionals were discouraged from collaborating, for they could not afford to work without receiving a wage in the very difficult post-war situation. In addition, some academics complained that Julio Martínez Santa-Olalla purposely ignored them (Beltrán Martínez, 1988:76; Castillo, 1949).

Among the first officially awarded the post of provincial commissar in 1941, however, there were a few museum keepers, some of whom also had chairs at the university. They were Martín Almagro Basch (Barcelona); Ricardo del Arco y Garay (Huesca); Isidro Ballester Tormo (Valencia); Jesús Carballo (Santander); Francisco Collantes de Terán (Sevilla); Juan Cuadrado (Almería); Augusto Fernández de Avilés (Murcia). At least in one case, that of José María Luengo Martínez (La Coruña), the post of provincial commissar was used to demand—and obtain—the directorship of the provincial museum. The only provincial commissar who was a professor but not a museum keeper was Cayetano Mergelina Luna (Valladolid). Julio Martínez Santa-Olalla, however, showed his disappointment with Mergelina's role as provincial commissar of Valladolid in a letter written in 1950. As Martínez Santa-Olalla pointed out, Mergelina had produced nothing as a provincial commissar. He was officially sacked in 1952, but, surprisingly, in the same year he was reappointed as provincial commissar of Murcia, where he had moved for personal reasons (AGA, FC, 218, 12/25). Other provincial
commissars of known professional background were the doctor Francisco Layna Serrano (Guadalajara), the painter Juan Porcar (Castellón), and religious officials: Santiago Gómez Santa-Cruz (Soria); Father Saturio González (Burgos); Serafin Tella (Salamanca) as well as Juan Serra Vilaró (local commissar of Tarragona).

As explained above, most of the provincial and local commissars were amateurs with other jobs and no professional training in archaeology. Despite some of them doing great good for archaeology, in the case of some others the system provided them with a way to legalize their often illegal dealings. Some letters of warning were needed and in extreme cases the CGEA had no other option but to dismiss the commissar. Such was the case of Luis R. Amorós Amorós (Mallorca), who was removed from office in 1951 for not adequately supervising an excavation (AGA, FC, 217, 12/25). Or that of Pedro Hernández Benítez (Telde, Las Palmas), who was dismissed because he had ignored the prohibition against owning private archaeological collections. Despite this, a similar case, that of Bartolomé Ensenat Estrany (Balearic Islands), did not produce the same results.

The lack of archaeological training of most provincial and local commissars persuaded Julio Martínez Santa-Olalla of the need for some guidance, which he gave in the form of memoranda. A complete collection of them has been kept by the Museo Canario (Ramirez Sanchez, 2000). They reveal the efforts made by the General Commissar to give advice on good practice in archaeology, mainly on the need to undertake detailed, controlled excavations, and of writing up competent reports. However, the sheer number of memoranda dealing with this subject makes clear how unsuccessful he was in his attempt. In memo 48 on 23 December 1955, the last one before the CGEA was discontinued, he lamented O.G.S. Crawford's harsh criticisms of fieldwork methods in Spain published in his 1953 book Archaeology in the Field. However, he could not help but partially acknowledge that the British archaeologist was right (MC, SJS, 61, 1, 8).

Not all commissars were happy with the system either. Criticisms were forthcoming from the early years. At the end of a report of the activities undertaken on the island of Gran Canaria in 1940, the provincial commissar, Sebastián Jiménez Sánchez, wrote:

> If the Commissariat I am in charge of had infrastructure and money I would have undertaken surveys. Their results would then have been archived either in the National Ethnological Museum or in the Museo Canario located in this province. However, without money neither surveys nor photographs of caves, tumuli, or primitive settlements can be undertaken. (MC, SJS, 69, 1, 2)

Other criticisms were voiced at the Archaeological Conferences of the Spanish Southeast, the forerunners to the National Archaeological Conferences (Castillo, 1949; Sánchez Jiménez, 1946; Velasco Rodríguez, 1946). At the 1950 National Assembly of Commissars of Archaeological Excavations, criticisms were also voiced (Actas . . . , 1951) (figures 6.2 and 6.3).
Figure 6.2. Closing talk by Julio Martínez Santa-Olalla at the I National Assembly of Commissars of Archaeological Excavations (Madrid, 1950).

Figure 6.3. The Minister of Education receives the delegates to the I National Assembly of Commissars of Archaeological Excavations (Madrid, 1950). Note Franco's portrait in the background.
4. THE EXCAVATIONS MANAGED BY THE CGEA

Beginning on 21 April 1941, one of the roles of the CGEA was to grant permissions and decide on funding for archaeological excavations. Yet, the documentation of the AGA shows that already in 1939 the CGEA had unofficially been fulfilling this role. The relationship between the director-commissars—as the directors of excavations were called—and the CGEA was terminated once the archaeological excavation had ended and the report been filed. A comparison with the sites excavated before the war is, again, indicative of the absence of major changes, at least in the first years.

The type of site excavated and the percentage of the subsidy received did not significantly differ from those before the war. From 1916 until 1934 the sites which received most funds had been the Islamic palace of Medina Azahara (Madinat al-Zahra) (403,750 pts, 22.4% of the total), and the Roman sites—most of them with Iron Age levels—of Mérida (319,000 pts, 17.6%), Itálica (235,000 pts, 12.6%), Numancia (108,750 pts, 6%), and Sagunto (89,250, 5.3%) (Díaz-Andreu, 2003: Table I). The documentation on subsidies to excavations by the CGEA after the war is fragmentary, but, during the 1940s, the sites which again received the highest funding were Medina Azahara (although only beginning in 1943), Itálica, Mérida, Numancia, and Sagunto (AGA, FC, 217, 218 and 219) (Díaz-Andreu 2003: Table II). As distinct from the previous period, there were now a couple of Iron Age sites among those with greater funds: Azaila and Sanchorreja. There were also more excavations of medieval Visigothic sites (Díaz-Andreu, 1996:80-83). Given that both the Iron Age and the migration period were connected with peoples arriving from beyond the Pyrenees from somewhere in central Europe—i.e. Germany—this may well have had a political purpose. However, comparison with the earlier periods indicates that such politicization of archaeology was not that significant. It is true that more Visigothic sites were excavated, and that, at least in the case of an excavation undertaken by Martinez Santa-Olalla, he collaborated with German archaeologists, with the result that some of the finds were—illegally—sent to the headquarters of Das Ahnenerbe in Berlin (Díaz-Andreu, 1996:79, 82–3; Werner, 1946:50). Yet, the funding of Visigothic sites obtained was not spectacular. In 1940, for example, in contrast with sites such as the Palaeolithic cave art site of La Pileta in Málaga (15,000 pts.), post-palaeolithic rock art sites in Ares del Maestre (7,000 pts), the Iron Age site of Azaila (20,000 pts.), the Roman sites of Ampurias (6,000 pts.), Itálica (20,000 pts.) and Mérida (30,000 pts.)—just to mention some examples—the Visigothic sites of Castiltierra, Herrera del Pisuerga and Yecla received just 8,000 pts., 3,000 pts. and 6,000 pts. respectively. The Islamic site of Medina Azahara was generously funded between 1942 and 1947, receiving 148,500 pts. in total. However, from 1948 no more money was granted to the excavation of this site.

Medinat Azahara was not the only site whose funds apparently came to an end. Most of the funds given during the early 1940s were granted to professionals
who had asked to excavate a particular site. Beginning in the mid-1940s, however, most funds were now generally given to the provincial commissars to excavate in their provinces, instead of being granted to specific sites. Therefore, we can assume that control of how the money was spent (whether it was on excavations, surveys, photographic material or a meal) became extremely relaxed. In this way it is possible that Julio Martínez Santa-Olalla had found a way to overcome criticisms by the provincial and local commissars regarding the lack of economic support we have highlighted above.

5. THE 1950S: BEGINNING OF THE END

The new international order after World War II led to important internal transformations in Franco’s Spain. One of the most significant was the change in the balance of power between the different factions that supported Franco, with the result that the Falange was displaced by the Opus Dei. The political allegiance of the main representatives of the CGEA—as explained above, both the General Commissar and the Vice-General Commissar were members of the Falange—left them in a weak position. To begin with, the power accumulated by Julio Martínez Santa-Olalla during the first decade of the regime had brought him many enemies. On the one hand he was suspected of being behind the failure of Hugo Obermaier (1877–1946)—whose chair was occupied by Martínez Santa-Olalla (who, in this way, managed to be the head of the Department [Seminario] of Primitive History of Man, i.e. prehistory, at the University of Madrid [Beltrán Martínez, 1988:76])—to return from exile. On the other hand, he had attempted to control all international projects—mainly of the Tabula Imperii Romani and the Corpus Vasorum Antiquorum—in which the archaeology section of the Higher Council for Scientific Research (CSIC) was involved. Although he was unsuccessful in his attempts to control the TIR, his ambition and the criticisms he had made of the others earned him hostility from his colleagues in that institution (Olmos, 1993:48; Plácido et al., 1993:62–3). The first sign that Julio Martínez Santa-Olalla’s power was on the wane came from the university. In 1954, the chair he had occupied on a temporary basis at the University of Madrid was awarded to a new rising star, Martín Almagro Basch.

Yet, for the CGEA the coup de grâce came after a letter was sent to the minister of National Education, Joaquín Ruiz-Giménez, on 31 January 1955. It was signed by seven professors. Following an order mainly based on seniority within their posts as professors, they were Luis Pericot García (Barcelona), Antonio García Bellido (Madrid), Alberto del Castillo (Barcelona), Antonio Beltrán (Zaragoza), Cayetano de Mergelina (Murcia), Juan Maluquer de Motes (Salamanca) and Martín Almagro (Madrid). In the letter, the main problems of (prehistoric) archaeology in Spain—essentially the existence of the General Commissariat for
Archaeological Excavations (CGEA)—were highlighted. The letter argued the need for urgent reform. They conceded that the creation of the Commissariat for Archaeological Excavations had been appropriate to regulate amateurs’ endeavours, but indicated that even from the start, problems had emerged. In their opinion, the CGEA was no longer efficient within a context of post-war national normality. Both the development of several research institutes under the umbrella of the Higher Council for Scientific Research (CSIC) and, in universities, the creation of more chairs and an increase in student numbers, had made the CGEA obsolete. The situation had become unsustainable and they dared to suggest the creation of a new Council in which all members of the professional archaeological community would participate. The new Council would provide permissions to excavate and deal with other matters regarding archaeology. It would be funded with the money now provided to the CGEA. No law was needed to undertake this change. The CGEA had been created by a decree and could be abolished by another one (AGA, 348, 12/25).

The letter had an immediate effect. On 2 December 1955 a decree abolished the CGEA and created a National Service for Archaeological Excavations (SNEA, Servicio Nacional de Excavaciones Arqueológicas). The SNEA was formed by a general inspector who had power over zone, provincial and local delegations (delegaciones de zona, provinciales y locales). The number of zone delegations would coincide with that of university districts in Spain and only professors of archaeology or a related field were entitled to be zone delegates. The decisions made by the General Inspector, including permissions to excavate, had to be ratified by an Advisory Council for Archaeological Excavations (Junta Consultiva de Excavaciones Arqueológicas) which had to meet at least twice a year. The Advisory Council was chaired by the General Director of Fine Arts (i.e. the person who was the direct superior of the General Inspector of the SNEA), with the general inspector acting as secretary. The rest of the council was mainly made up of the twelve zone delegates. At a later stage other members were added: the directors of the National Archaeological Museum and of the Maritime Museum, the General Commissariat of the Service for the Defence of National Artistic Heritage, the chair of Prehistory at the University of Madrid and the Secretary of the General Inspectorate of Excavations.

As distinct from the CGEA, the new organization made sure that the academic background of an individual in post was adequate. We have already explained that only professors of archaeology or of a related field were entitled to be zone delegates. Similar rules applied for the General Inspector. Heads of the provincial delegations would preferably be the directors of the archaeological museums, history teachers or the local representatives (académicos correspondientes) of the Academies of History and of Fine Arts. Regarding the heads of the local delegations, the post could be given to someone with sufficient archaeological training. Art graduates (i.e. graduates of Filosofía y Letras, therefore including those studying prehistory
and ancient history), architects and academicians of the Royal Academies referred to above, were favored. The latter measure meant that, theoretically, many of those recruited by Martínez Santa-Olalla were not going to be able to continue in post.

The decree, however, contemplated a transitory period during which all those in post would remain. Thus, Julio Martínez Santa-Olalla was given the post of General Inspector. Yet, his power was now curtailed by the Advisory Council for Archaeological Excavations. He left his post in 1957 (Enciclopedia, 1908–210). However, the transition dragged on until 1968, when the “transitory period” finally ended. Provincial and local delegates were notified and their responsibilities passed on to the provincial delegates of fine arts (delegados provinciales de Bellas Artes).

6. DISCUSSION

This chapter has examined a case of archaeological heritage administration under a right-wing dictatorship. We have particularly centered our discussion on the service which from 1939 until 1955 organized archaeological fieldwork in Spain under General Francisco Franco’s dictatorship (1936/39–1975), the General Commissariat for Archaeological Excavations (CGEA, Comisaría General de Excavaciones Arqueológicas). The analysis of the functioning of the CGEA can be used as an example of the interaction between archaeology and politics, but also of how other factors may nuance such an interaction. During the sixteen years that the CGEA lasted, the dictatorship had to adapt to the changing international scene. Following a fascist or semi-fascistic phase that lasted until 1943, the regime adopted a more low key stance in which anti-communism and Catholicism were emphasized as its main components. However, changes in the administration of archaeology moved at a much slower pace. The service continued untouched until 1955, and then it entered a transitional period which eventually finished in 1968.

Several issues can be emphasized based on the development of the CGEA during the 1940s and 1950s. First, we would like to argue that it is important to take into account the main actors’ personalities when analyzing how archaeological institutions are run. The influence of personality is clear when we compare the evolution under similar circumstances of the German Archaeological Institute (DAI—Deutsches Archaeologisches Institut) in Germany (Junker, 1998) to the CGEA in Spain. The comparison of the strategies followed by both institutions shows striking differences. The direction of the DAI by Theodor Wiegand from 1932 till 1936, despite his “ambition and thirst for power,” proved to be extremely valuable because of “his talent for developing clever strategies” (Junker, 1998:284). The result of this was that the Institute strengthened its overall position. Nothing
similar happened in Spain. The CGEA's General Commissar, Julio Martínez Santa-Olalla, was also a man with obvious ambition and a thirst for power but probably not with the same talent. The documentation discussed in this article points to the speed with which the CGEA isolated itself from the professional world and increasingly relied on non-professionals for the management of archaeology. Meanwhile, archaeologists working in universities and museums were marginalized and prevented from conducting fieldwork. On reading some of what he wrote (Díaz-Andreu, 1993:77) and reviewing his opinions of colleagues—made explicit in virulent letters (Plácido et al., 1993:62–63)—Martínez Santa-Olalla's motives become apparent. He just did not want anybody to interfere with his power. The differences between the DAI and the CGEA are further stressed when we contrast the attitude towards the directives received from the government. Whereas in the DAI, little attention was paid to the decree abolishing its internal democratic functioning (Junker, 1998:284), the autocratic modus operandi instituted in the CGEA by Julio Martínez Santa-Olalla shows the way in which the General Commissar benefited from the system to his own advantage. Yet, one must not forget that the starting point of the periods we are comparing for both institutions were very different and this may explain some of these contrasts. Whereas the politization of the DAI emerged from a democratic election, the CGEA was an institution created after a fratricidal war.

Secondly, one might wonder how different the situation during Franco's dictatorship was compared to that earlier in the century. To start with, if we examine the issue of the promotion of non-professionals, the fact is that, as we have already pointed out, the majority of the excavations sanctioned by the pre-war archaeological heritage service—the JSEA and, after 1933, the JTS—were undertaken by non-professionals. Moreover, although a more detailed analysis is needed, poor results by non-professionals appear to have been a common denominator in both periods. The excavation reports which were published both before and after the war were not written by the non-professionals, but mainly by those trained and working either in museums or in universities. Despite this, the documents stored at the National Archive for the Administration show no major sign of institutions demanding a publication in return for funds being made available. Memoranda to provincial and local commissars sent by Julio Martínez Santa-Olalla after the war seem to be the closest to a recrimination for the lack of results, and as we argued earlier in the article, their sheer number indicate that they did not have much of an impact. In addition, perhaps Martínez Santa-Olalla was not so keen to encourage his subordinates to publish, given that he did not write much himself. However, the absence of major differences between the first three decades of the century and the period in which the CGEA was active—mainly the 1940s and 1950s—does not mean that it was reasonable to expect such a state of affairs. Under normal circumstances, a gradual replacement of non-professionals by professionals would be expected. Nothing of the kind occurred until the 1960s, and in fact we could even argue that at times, and particularly during the 1950s,
the opposite was the case. This period of decadence may explain why Spanish archaeology declined from a relatively high standard before the war to a very poor one after it.

The discussion in the previous paragraph leads to the third issue we want to highlight, the way dictatorships may be detrimental to the development of science. This will not come as a surprise to many. However, we want to argue that, as the example of the CGEA shows, one of the reasons for the harm produced by totalitarian regimes may be that the government is not usually interested in the scientific quality of those in charge of institutions but in their political allegiance. In the case looked at in this article, Julio Martínez Santa-Olalla was certainly not one of the most qualified academics when he obtained the position he did. He attained it through political means, by flagging his membership in the fascist interest group—the Falange—then the dominant power in Franco's dictatorship. The poor outcome is not, therefore, that surprising. Yet, again, it could be pointed out that the system on which this decision was based—the patronage system—was a survival from the previous period. As already pointed out with respect to candidates for permanent posts in museums and universities, both before and after the Civil War selection procedures were governed by a strong patronage system. The most sought after feature in candidates was their fidelity to their patrons, their proficiency for the job being secondary. This system worked at all levels, even at that of the heads of institutions. Before the war, for example, neither the former head of the Commission for Palaeontological and Prehistoric Research (CIPP—Comisión de Investigaciones Paleontológicas y Prehistóricas) (Rasilla Vives, 1997), nor that of the JSEA/JTA had been an archaeologist. Political reasons lay behind their appointments. Thus, when after the death of the former leader of the CIPP in 1922 a professional—an excellent professional of the calibre of Eduardo Hernández-Pacheco—was chosen as director, the power of the institution rapidly declined (Díaz-Andreu, 2000:375–6). However, as in the case discussed in the previous paragraph, similarity between both periods is not what one would have expected. The growth in the number of professionals should have put the situation right by the time of the CGEA, and this means that the best qualified should have been selected to head the institution. This, as argued above, was not the case.

A final issue we want to emphasize from the analysis of the CGEA refers to nationalism. As one of us has discussed elsewhere (Díaz-Andreu, 1997b), in contrast with what is usually assumed, nationalist movements are not homogeneous. Spanish nationalists under the Francoist dictatorship did not hold a single idea of Spain. Thus, whereas archaeologists tried to vindicate the importance of the remote past in the historical formation of the Spanish nation, very little interest in this was shown by the regime. The paramount stress regarding the historical roots of the nation was put on the early modern period, when Spain attained its religious and territorial unity and became an imperial power. Yet, despite being ignored, archaeologists persisted and, to a degree, their opinions had some impact. However, archaeologists did not all have the same opinion. They did not have a
uniform stance. Few of them agreed about what particular period should be seen as the primeval Golden Age. For García y Bellido the roots of the nation could be found with the Iberians, with the sculpture of the Dama de Elche representing the first Spanish lady (García y Bellido, 1943). Alberto del Castillo, however, looked back at the Beaker period (Castillo in Menéndez Pidal, 1947), whereas Martínez Santa-Olalla thought that the Atlantic Bronze Age (Martínez Santa-Olalla, 1941) as well as the Celts (Ruiz Zapatero, 1996) represented the historical origin of Spain. Opportunism is an issue we need to consider here, as in all three cases the primeval origin of the Spanish nation was that period with which these archaeologists were most familiar.

Archaeology lost its political innocence more than a decade ago, when postmodernism hit our discipline (Shanks and Tilley, 1987a; Shanks and Tilley, 1987b). It shed a different light on most provinces of archaeological enquiry, including historiography, and as a result new questions were asked of the same old problems. In the field of historiography, with the exception of some works on the context within which archaeology had developed (for example Clark, 1934; Himmelman, 1976), archaeologists had mainly concentrated on an internalist description of the development of ideas. In contrast, it is now increasingly accepted by most people that archaeological practice has political implications. Yet, recent research on the political contextualization of archaeology have proved how naive archaeologists themselves can be when writing the history of the political context of archaeology. We are learning to be more cautious in the way we expect both people to behave and institutions and ideologies to develop. We can no longer contemplate them as homogeneous and fixed, but instead should think of them as full of complexities, contradictions, subtleties, and interactions with each other which makes their examination an increasingly intricate task. Identities—professional, religious, political, national, of gender, age, class and status—are now seen as influential in the way events develop. We have included most of these issues in the assessment of our case study. Questions such as changing ideologies, gender, sexual orientation, influence of personal biographies, opportunism, and nationalism have all formed part of the analysis developed above. Rather than simply reinforcing a post-modern position, however, for us the aim of this study has been the attempt to better understand what went on at a particular time in the history of our discipline. This is what we hope we have achieved: a greater understanding of Spanish archaeology under Franco’s dictatorship.

Notes

1. We disagree, therefore, with those who are of the opinion that the dictatorship had no impact on archaeology (Gilman, 1995).
2. The Spanish falangist party was called the Falange. It was created by José Antonio Primo de Rivera in 1933. In 1934 it joined a more openly fascist organisation, the Juntas of the
National Syndicalist Offensive (JONS—Junta de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalistas). The new party was now called the Falange Española y de las JONS, although it was still popularly known as the Falange. In 1937 Franco fused the Falange and the Carlist party, calling the new group the Traditionalist Spanish Falange and the Junta of the National Syndicalist Offensive (FET de las JONS—Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista). During all these changes the Falange remained the dominant partner (Smith, 1996:146-150).

3. The Servicio de Defensa del Patrimonio Artístico Nacional was created in 1938 (BOE 23.4.1938). In the same year, however, it was renamed Servicio de Defensa y Recuperación del Patrimonio Histórico Nacional (BOE 12.8.1938). From 1955, when the CGEA was abolished, the newly created National Service for Archaeological Excavations depended on the General Direction of Fine Arts (Dirección General de Bellas Artes).

4. The absence of any documentation on them in the files of the General Archive for the Administration, where all the blueprints of the CGEA are archived, appears to point to the CGEA not having had zone commissars. This seems to be confirmed by the fact that Martínez Santa-Olalla did not mention them in his 1946 article on the CGEA (Martínez Santa-Olalla, 1946:54).

5. Another source, however, seems to imply that he stayed in Bonn until 1935 (San Valero, 1978).


7. As explained in Díaz-Andreu (1993:77) the previous professor had been Hugo Obermaier, a German priest who in 1924 was given Spanish citizenship. Obermaier was not in Spain when the Civil War started and never came back because "he was not an example of German bravery" (Caro Baroja, 1978:318). Like another young archaeologist of the time, Julio Caro Baroja, has explained, Obermaier's non-involvement in the Spanish Civil War was the main factor that stopped him from taking up his chair again (Caro Baroja, 1978:318 and pers. comm. to MDA). Other contemporaries, however, have implied that Martínez Santa-Olalla may have had something to do with Obermaier's downfall (pers. comm. to MDA; the source requested anonymity). We have been unable to confirm either of both hypotheses.

8. Informes y Memorias de la Comisaría General de Excavaciones, the main publisher in Spain of site reports between 1942 and 1956, Acta Arqueológica Hispánica, Cuadernos de Historia Primitiva (published since 1946), and Atlantis. Actas y Memorias de la Sociedad Española de Antropología, Etnografía y Prehistoria (second series after the Civil War from 1940).

9. The Blue Division was a Spanish infantry regiment which fought in the German army on the Russian front between 1941 and 1943 (Smith, 1996:57).

10. The reference (AGA, 219, 4) refers to documentation archived at the General Archive of the Administration (Archivo General de la Administración) located in Alcalá de Henares, box 219, document 4.

11. Julio Martínez Santa-Olalla graduated and later taught at the university of Madrid. There, before the Civil War, women students were not even considered for summer excavations and were thereby excluded from the camaraderie which these created between students and lecturers, in particular between Hugo Obermaier, Professor of the History of Primitive Man at the University of Madrid, and his students. Women were thought to be, as one of the female students at the time told one of us, "a disruptive and undesirable element" on excavations (Oliveros Rives, pers. comm. to MDA) (Díaz-Andreu, 1998b:132).

12. Regarding Julián San Valero, in a prologue for a book written by Martínez Santa-Olalla he explained that they had met at a camp organized by the University of Murcia in Sierra Espuña in 1932. They met again at the University of Madrid, where San Valero was a
student in a course taught by Martínez Santa-Olalla (San Valero, 1978). San Valero seems to have been subject to harsh reprisals after the civil war because of his political activities during his period as a student at the University of Valencia, a situation that Martínez Santa-Olalla helped to end (Martín, pers. comm. 14.4.2000). After the war, in 1943, when as San Valero said, he could return to his university projects, he helped Martínez Santa-Olalla teaching practicals, wrote a Ph.D. under Martínez Santa-Olalla’s supervision (approved in 1946), and collaborated with him in some of his various cultural ventures (San Valero, 1978) until he attained a professorship at the University of Granada in 1948 and moved to Valencia two years later.

13. Although, by no means did all students obtain jobs in archaeology. During the academic year 1939–40, Martínez Santa-Olalla had nine students. As far as we know, of the nine only one, a woman, obtained a job in archaeology (Concepción Fernández Chicarro de Dios). We do not have any information regarding what the others did after their degrees (Julian Gimeno; Trinidad Ledesma Ramos; Leopoldo Marcos Calleja; María Josefa Marín Bonachera; Pilar Pérez Enciso; María Jesús Picornell y de Soto; Juan de los Reyes García; and Manuel Segura y Suárez-Inclán) (information obtained by MDA from a box kept at the National Archaeological Museum with photographs which had belonged to Julio Martínez Santa-Olalla).

14. Information obtained in letters found at the Archive of the Museo Canario.

15. Crawford was the main organiser of the Tabula Imperii Romani (Plácido et al., 1993) and probably had heard about Julio Martínez Santa-Olalla’s attempt to control Spanish participation in the TIR project. This may be at the root of his 1953 criticism.

16. As stated earlier in this article, official posts for provincial and local commissars were only made official by the decree of 30 April 1941. However, the documentation available at the Museo Canario makes clear that Julio Martínez Santa-Olalla already had collaborators in various provinces. This seems to have been the case with Sebastián Jiménez Sánchez (Ramírez Sánchez, 2000:422), who was only officially made provincial commissar on 29 May 1941 (AGA 217).

17. It must be noted, however, that superior to the decrees of 1941, the legislation in force was the law of the National Artistic Treasure of 13 May 1933 with its regulations (reglamento) of 16 April 1936.


19. It was ended by the decree 2538/1968 of 25 September 1968 (BOE 27 November 1968), later developed by the Ministerial decree of 24 February 1969 (BOE 55, 5 March 1969).

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In contrast, the leaders of a democratically elected government may also seek to manipulate the archaeological record (Díaz-Andreu and Champion, 1996b:7; Trigger 1984), but because they often do not possess exclusive control over artistic and communications media, ideological propaganda may be less effective. Furthermore, political dissent in a democracy in general may be more widespread.