6 A remote province: a chance, a challenge or a burden?

Through the analysis of the history of a single region, the present book aims to study the principles and standards employed by supreme and territorial rulers in the governance of distant provinces and their transformations. The analytical arguments in Chapters 2–5 have offered some interesting insights in this matter. They shed some light on the ways the rulers responded to the challenges and seized the opportunities created in such a distant region in the tenth to twelfth centuries. The results of particular chapters were briefly summarized in their final sections (sub-chapters 3.5, 4.5 and 5.8). The subject-oriented and diachronic order of those partial summaries may mislead us into believing that the events, policies and decisions formed a sort of continuum, which is clearly a misconception. While the significance of the *longue durée* phenomena should not be ignored, it needs to be argued that the area of governance was predominantly shaped by the views and personalities of successive decision-makers as well as the circumstances in which they operated. This is largely the case even now, when politics is highly institutionalized. Thus, it appears obvious that the decisions of particular actors and groups were even more important in the Middle Ages, when all issues related to power, governance and the judiciary were regulated rather by the decisions of “Big Men” conveyed through rituals than by the legal prescriptions. That is why it seems reasonable to look at the dynamics of events from a synchronic perspective, which can allow us to follow the situation changes and policy directions between the periods of rule of particular monarchs and dynasties.

6.1 Dynamics of royal and territorial strategies of governance applied in Upper Lusatia

In order to show the tendencies in the governance of Upper Lusatia through comparison of policies applied by successive rulers, it would be advisable to measure their intensity. There are, of course, no quantitative criteria applicable. Nevertheless, some qualitative ones may be – at least provisionally – developed for both immediate and structural means of governance, as referred to in the sub-chapter 1.2. For both those groups of means of governance, four degrees of intensity can be distinguished. The bottom level of the scale is obvious and identical for both immediate and structural means: this is the case of political autonomy of a province ruled by domestic (aboriginal) elites and loosely subordinated to the external center of power (Level 1). The higher degrees in both groups of means of governance are linked with direct rule exercised by the center of authority, based upon its own elites.
Dynamics of royal and territorial strategies of governance applied in Upper Lusatia

Table 6.1: Levels of intensity of the immediate and structural means of governance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Means of governance</th>
<th>Immediate</th>
<th>Structural</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level 1</td>
<td>Autonomy of the province, ruled by its own elite</td>
<td>Extensive strategy: Province managed as a benefice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 2</td>
<td>Extensive strategy: members of external elite engaged indirectly</td>
<td>Institutionalization: Province governed by officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 3</td>
<td>Intensification (horizontal and/or vertical)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 4</td>
<td>Maximal intensification: Province entrusted to <em>hominis novi</em></td>
<td>Intensified institutionalization (horizontally and/or vertically)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regarding the immediate means, governance in a territory could be exercised in an extensive manner by entrusting it (like a passive resource) to a person residing outside the province (Level 2) or in an intensive manner, by engaging a larger number of actors (Level 3), e.g. by appointing a separate count for a province (horizontal intensification) or by bestowing there estates to the church institutions that were dependent on the ruler (vertical intensification). Finally, the most intensive strategy of applying the direct means of governance (Level 4) is entrusting the power over a province to individuals from outside the ruling elite (*hominis novi*). The above classification is fairly intuitive and would certainly need to be elaborated if it were to be of any use in future studies of other regions.

It is less problematic, largely thanks to the application of legal concepts, to categorize the structural means of power in terms of their intensity. The least intensive of these was a beneficiary relation which was part of the sphere of *dominium*, not the sphere of *imperium* (Level 2). A more intensive way of exercising control through structural means was to entrust the province governance to an official; in High Middle Ages reality, to a count (Level 3). Finally, the officials’ governance could be intensified by the establishment of additional structures in a given region, either new administrative districts (horizontal intensification) or new institutions that were parallel to the existing ones (vertical intensification).

6.1.1 Strategies of the monarchs

The results of the analysis that focused on how intensively particular means of power were used by the successive German monarchs in their governance of Upper Lusatia are presented in Figure 6.1. The analysis leads to some interesting conclusions.

The Upper Lusatia example shows that Level 1 means of governance could be applied even in the case of a political and military confrontation between strong centers of power as long as this confrontation did not turn into a direct military clash between the major forces of the parties involved. In all respects, the Liudolfings wanted
to maintain only tributary superiority over the Milčane, who, as can be inferred from the few but significant sources (written and material), were loyal allies and reliable tribute payers. However, in the wake of such events as the conquest of Meissen by Boleslav II the Pious (985) and his military confrontation with Mieszko I (989–990), the only way to maintain control of this border region was its incorporation and militarization (the burgward structure) by Margrave Ekkehard I.

What is striking is the fact that even when faced with an ultimate military threat, the Liudolfings and the first Salians did not resort to the Level 4 means of governance in Milsko. It can be speculated that any external threat forced the uniformity of command and the consolidation of elites (cf. Blaschke 2000/2003, 11–12). These situations did not stir rebellious impulses in the people who governed the provinces, and did not make the king resort to extraordinary measures that would undermine the magnates’ honor and position (classified as belonging to Group 4 of the immediate and structural means). The Liudolfings had a fairly comfortable situation in the eastern marches. After all, the Ottonians nominated their comites from among their Saxon subjects and loyal supporters. As the German monarchs often visited the neighboring regions (cf. Müller-Mertens 1980, 140–147, passim; Alvermann 1998, 203–206; Stieldorf 2012, 441, 449) and even the eastern frontiers for either non-military (Otto III) or military (Henry II) reasons, they had ample opportunities to see for themselves how the situation evolved there. In those circumstances, successive rulers could grant the local margraves a large scope of freedom of action, and even to enlarge it, e.g. by turning their benefices into allods, which in the case of Ekkehard I is evidenced by

Figure 6.1: Relation of immediate and structural means in the governance of Upper Lusatia ca. 950–1157.
Thietmar’s chronicle (V 7, MGH SS rer. Germ. NS 9, 228–229). It seems, though, that Ekkehard I’s rise to power was a formidable memento for Henry II, whose major contender to the throne in 1002 proved to be the then Margrave of Meissen. Hence, the last ruler from the Liudolfing dynasty strove to intensify his control of Ekkehard’s legacy by creating a separate comitatus in Milsko, which was governed by Count Herman I, and by a generous contribution to the Diocese of Meissen (more on Henry’s church and personal policies in Stieldorf 2012, 456–458).

As has been shown in Section 3.2.1, Henry II’s policy was originally pursued by his successor, Conrad II, who, however, soon opted out of this approach, letting Ekkehard II unite not only all of his father’s marches but also the so-called Saxon Eastern March. Based on the above-mentioned elusive documentation (Chapters 4.1 and 5.6), it seems that Milsko was the area where Ekkehard II was granted fairly broad prerogatives. It can even be argued that in eastern Upper Lusatia, the margrave, who must have had the king’s approval, ruled the area destroyed by war (the 1015 campaign) in a sovereign manner. He created his own alodial estates, which were seized by the crown only after his death in 1046, and granted other areas to the Diocese of Meissen. These were by no means unprecedented measures. They were perfectly in line with other steps taken by Ekkehard in agreement with Conrad II (primarily including the change of the seat of the diocese from Zeitz to Naumburg). It seems that Conrad II and Henry III were ready to give virtually all their powers in this distant area away in order to let the Margrave, supported by the bishops, organize both local defense and the basis for offensive steps against Poland and Bohemia. The withdrawal of the monarchs involved not only Upper Lusatia but actually all the eastern foreground of Thuringia. Conrad II and Henry III did not hesitate not only to restore the Ekkehardines in Milsko, but also to install them in the Saxon Eastern March with Lower Lusatia, creating thus a huge conglomerate of land and a bundle of powers over it, finally united in the hands of Ekkehard II in 1038. Both first rulers of the Salian dynasty contributed to the advance of Ekkehard II to the grade of power comparable to the ducal level. They must have trusted him personally and were probably, at the same time, ready to risk creation by the Margrave of a strong center of power in the eastern borderlands of the Empire to checkmate the Piasts and the Přemyslids.

Ekkehard II’s position was extremely strong: he wielded more power than Wiprecht of Groitzsch several decades later or Conrad the Great of the House of Wettin a hundred years later. This phenomenon clearly deserves elaboration given that the margrave built his status during the reign of Conrad II, who was known for his tough stand on the material interests of the monarchy (cf. Schneider 1992, 125–127, 135; Wolfram 2006, 191–194, passim). Without doubt, the monarch rarely visited this region (cf. Müller-Mertens, Huschner 1992, 153, 344) as he probably chose to rely on the trusted margraves in governing and defending the eastern frontier (cf. Stieldorf 2012, 469), which was continuously in a state of war emergency. There is no denying that Ekkehard II was a loyal supporter of Conrad right from the start of his reign (cf.
Wolfram 2006, 187), which, however, does not explain why the emperor allowed him to concentrate so much power on the eastern frontier. As there is no information on any arrangements between the king and the margrave on this matter, it can only be speculated that the founder of the Salian dynasty assumed that Ekkehard would not leave an heir to his vast allodial estates or a candidate to take over his numerous posts. In the 1030s, when Ekkehard, who was in his forties at the time, took control of the March of Meissen and the Saxon Eastern March, that assumption was risky but it made sense. The margrave had been married since 1026, but had no children. It is probably for this reason that Conrad II broke with Henry II’s policy of tighter control of the eastern frontiers of the Empire, despite the erratic relations his predecessor had with the Ekkehardines. It has to be admitted that the emperor’s assumption proved to be right: following Ekkehard’s death, his allods, including the estates in Eastern Upper Lusatia, were inherited by Conrad II’s son and successor, Henry III, and the marches of the deceased divided anew according to his will.

Ekkehard II’s inheritance was divided by Henry III in 1046. However, this did not yet mark a dramatic change in the general policy line pursued by Conrad II. The frontier territories (Upper and Lower Lusatia) remained under the governance of a single margrave, Dedi II (from the family closely cooperating with Conrad II) and were regarded as his ‘special demesne’. The changes implemented after Dedi II’s conflict with Henry IV in 1069, when Milsko was reunited with the March of Meissen (as I tried to show in section 3.2.2), were also rather superficial in nature; however, given Egbert II’s minority, they had a very beneficial effect on the monarch in a short-term perspective. All of the briefly discussed examples from the period of the first Saliens yield a fairly coherent image. When an opportunity to increase the king’s influence on the remote eastern provinces arose (either through the inheritance of the deceased margrave’s estates or a clever division of the territories between the counts), the monarchs would seize it. In general, however, the emperors neither made demanding investments nor entered into conflicts with the Saxon elite to increase their scope of power in the remote peripheries of the Empire.

It was not until Egbert II joined the Saxon rebellion that Henry IV decided to take drastic measures. The king was forced to turn to one of the immediate means from Group 4, a move which was rightly viewed by the Saxons as both radical and unjust. He granted the eastern provinces to *hominis novi*: first to Vratislav II, then to Wiprecht of Groitzsch. It is striking that in the period from the reign of Henry IV until the reign of Lothair III, the intensification of the immediate means of governance was not accompanied by the intensification of the structural means. In fact, the trend was the reverse: the *hominis novi* governed the provinces on more beneficial terms than members of the old Saxon elite. They were granted the rule of Milsko not as a *comitatus*, but as a benefice (Vratislav II, Wiprecht of Groitzsch, Hoyer of Mansfeld). Sometimes they were even offered additional prerogatives of power. It can thus be concluded that the closer the personal relationship between the king and the province governor was, the weaker the structural means of governance were used by
the monarchs. Interestingly, Upper and Lower Lusatia differed in this respect from the areas situated to the west, where Henry IV and Henry V established burgraviates in Meissen and Dohna. In doing so, they combined the most intensive direct means (by replacing the regional governors with *hominis novi*) and similar structural means (by creating new institutions).

In Upper Lusatia, this sort of policy was applied only by Conrad III and Frederick I in the early years of his reign. They reincorporated Upper Lusatia into the margravial system and strived at increasing direct royal control over it. It is hard to judge whether this was an attempt of a systemic change, aiming at expanding the zone of direct rule of the monarchs in the eastern provinces, or rather a spin-off effect of the general unease in Bohemia after the death of Soběslav I, which forced the Staufers to tighten their control over the borderland. It was, however, perfectly in line with other measures taken by Conrad III and Frederick I, aiming at systematic expansion of the royal power basis in the eastern provinces. Given this background, it might be concluded that it was only short-term political needs (the need to win the support of Vladislav II) that were behind Frederick I’s decision to offer Milško as a fief to Vladislav II in 1157 (cf. Sobiesiak 2011, 93–94). On the other hand, it must be recalled here that as soon as Vladislav II found his rule over Bohemia stable enough to get engaged in Italian affairs of Frederick I, the emperor gave him away all his powers in Upper Lusatia, including the newly created burgraviate. Moreover, he never tried to retrieve the land, in spite of having many opportunities to (see below, section 6.1.3). Thus, the second monarch from the Staufic dynasty returned to the policy of “Bohemian gambit”, which was started by Henry IV and will be still commented on below, in the section 6.1.3. At the same time, the land of the Nižane was left in the hands of the Margrave of Meissen and under supervision of the royal burgrave of Dohna. This shows the actual limits of royal ambitions under Frederick I: to control the main route from Meissen to Bohemia, but not necessarily Upper Lusatia.

6.1.2 Strategies of the territorial rulers

Just as in the case of Henry III and Henry IV, calculation of Frederick I to loosen control over Upper Lusatia proved wrong. The territorial rulers pursued their own policies, usually in accordance with subsequent monarchs, whose grace “fuelled” their advance, but always keeping in mind their own positions and interests of their families. We know well what those policies led to: the Kingdom of Germany was eventually split into autonomous territorial lordships. This fact has long had a bearing on the interpretation of events that took place in the High Middle Ages. Leaving aside the historiographical problem of whether and to what extent the extension of power basis by the dukes and margraves in the tenth to twelfth centuries prepared the grounds for future events, it is worth looking at the example of Upper Lusatia to see what opportunities the territorial rulers were offered, and how they
made use of them. This problem has already been discussed above in connection with the Ekkehardines. The example of this family clearly shows that the construction of a power base in the eastern provinces was until the mid-tenth century largely dependent on the approval of successive kings. They decided on the nominations in the eastern marches (however, with the approval of the Saxon elites; cf. the case of the deposition of Gunzelin from the March of Meissen in 1009: Thietmar VI, 55, MGH SS rer. Germ. NS 9, 340–343) but also on the range of competences and prerogatives of the individuals governing the provinces. Those prerogatives, in particular under the Ekkehardines, could be surprisingly large. The genesis of the episcopal estates in eastern Upper Lusatia shows that the margraves in this most remote province were even granted some of royal powers, i.e. the right to alienate estates. As already mentioned, Conrad II’s political calculations could have been related to Ekkehard II’s childlessness. Nevertheless, although in the 1030’s the monarch had enough data to suppose that Ekkehard II would die childless, it was still a probability, in no case a certainty. Eventually, following the margrave’s death, Henry III was engaged in dividing his inheritance and taking over his alodial estates. It is significant that also after 1046 the rulers did not interfere with the governance of Milsko. They restricted their activity to granting the estates inherited from the Ekkehardines as fiefs. There is also no information whether the margraves themselves strove to build autonomous power bases in the remote regions. It seems that both parties were satisfied with this state of affairs: even though province governance did not bring any special profits to the ruler or the margraves, it did not generate substantial costs, either.

When in 1076 Upper Lusatia was granted by Henry IV to the homo novus, Vratislav II, the situation did not change significantly. The Bohemian duke treated this area in a similar way as the Saxon elites did. He quickly ceded the troublesome provinces behind the mountains to Wiprecht II of Groitzsch, who showed a more ‘managerial’ approach to the land he had received along with the hand of Duchess Judith. It was under Wiprecht and his son Henry that the Church of St. Wenceslaus in Jauernick was probably founded and the first fortification in Görlitz was constructed. It is also worth noting that Duchess Judith and her son, Count Henry, resided in Budyšín, at least temporarily. Moreover, some of the coins of Henry of Groitzsch were probably struck in Budyšín and the composition of the hoard from Kaschwitz leaves no doubt that the younger son of Wiprecht II established his effective monetary monopoly in Upper Lusatia (cf. details in App. 7.1.4). On the other hand, there is no information about any strong involvement on the part of the Groitzsch lords to build a sovereign lordship in Upper Lusatia (e.g. erecting castles, colonization efforts or foundation of monasteries). Nevertheless, the control of Wiprecht II of Groitzsch over Upper Lusatia was probably significantly stronger and more stable than the rule of his contemporary, Henry I of Eilenburg, over Lower Lusatia – as shown by the renowned episode noted down in the Nienburg Fragment, when Margrave Henry had to restore his authority over the easternmost fringes of that province by force (CDA 5, 353; see also Lehmann 1963, 24). We also must take into account that the house of Groitzsch
actually did not have enough time, opportunities and motivation to effectively strive for a territorial lordship in Upper Lusatia: Wiprecht II was deprived of the territory for five years (1112–1117) or longer, and his son Henry, having no male heir, at least from the year 1128 was ready to give it away according to the suggestions of Lothair III. Would he act like this having a son able to take over the heritage? Or rather would he tend to build a strong lordship based on Upper Lusatia? Answers to these questions lay, unfortunately, far beyond the possibilities of historical inquiry.

The policy pursued by Duke Soběslav I in Upper Lusatia may be, on the contrary, seen very clearly and interpreted as aiming at the creation of an exclave of strong and direct influence of this ruler. With the acquisition of Eastern Upper Lusatia as a benefice, and then the whole of Milsko from Lothair III, Duke Soběslav I took a wide range of measures to build his de facto autonomous lordship. He erected and extended a fortified stronghold in Görlitz and donated tribute money to the Bohemian Church. He also probably made a mutually beneficial exchange of lands with the Bishop of Meissen, and relieved the bishop’s subjects from the duty to build ringforts (cf. details in section 4.4.1). Such a policy fits well into the general view of Soběslav I’s activity as a ruler, who built or rebuilt several castles on the borders of his realm (Přimda, Tachov, Klodzko, Görlitz), which were controlled directly by him (FRB 2, 205, 206, 212–213, 394; cf. Žemlička 1997, 177). As far as it may be assessed basing upon scarce source reference, these military establishments served not only as lodgments for military campaigns – which at least Görlitz and Klodzko undoubtedly were – but also strengthened ducal control over the realm, blocking important passages into Bohemia. Ducal castles on the fringes of the land – as castrum munitissimum Přimda or Dohna – were also used in the twelfth century as places of imprisonment for the ruling duke’s competitors (FRB 2, 268, 419, 452, 465, 467–468).

All of the measures taken by Soběslav in the borderland of the Empire, including those in the lands on the Nysa, were endorsed by Lothair III. They lead us into believing that the emperor gave his tacit or explicit agreement to create in the eastern provinces a complex of estates and prerogatives concentrated by the befriended ruler from the Přemyslid dynasty, even if that meant diminishing his own powers. It can even be hypothesized that Soběslav’s set of estates and prerogatives (aptly called cura Siriae by a Bohemian chronicler) could have turned into something more permanent, had it not been for the turmoil in Bohemia in the 1140s. Worth noting is the fact that after the death of the energetic Bohemian duke, the German king recognized the assumption of the cura Siriae by his successor even though Soběslav was not succeeded by his son (which could have undermined Vladislav II’s right to receive this part of his uncle’s realm, being held by him as a benefice). It was only after Vladislav II was dethroned that Conrad III decided to reclaim the Přemyslids’ possessions.

That land was granted to Conrad the Great of Wettin, who thus united most of the Groitzsch lords’ legacy. Interestingly, the new governor of Milsko and Zagozd began his rule with a dispute with the Bishop of Meissen over the scope of his power over the bishop’s subjects. This fact is not surprising given that from 1081 Upper Lusatia
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was not a part of any comitatus, which could have triggered doubts over the scope of duties of the inhabitants of episcopal villages. On the other hand, this should be interpreted as a signum temporis. What this meant was that Conrad, just like Soběslav I, seriously approached the basis and scope of the power that was entrusted to him in the remote provinces of the Empire (similar problems were at the very same time being resolved by him also for other parts of his dominion, cf. Ziegler 2008, 485–486). This approach of the new lord of Upper Lusatia could have had also an economic dimension, as all of the identified coins in the hoard from Purschwitz were struck on behalf of the Margrave (unfortunately, only four coins were identified, cf. details in App. 7.1.4). Conrad’s approach becomes easier to understand in the context of the appointment of royal burgraves in Meissen and Dohna. Following this decision, Milsko and Zagozd remained those parts of the Groitzsch lords’ legacy where Conrad had the greatest freedom of action (cf. the remarks of Thieme, Kobuch 2005, 83–84, passim on the bad situation of the Wettins compared to their competitors in the land of Nižane). This did not last for long. Already at the beginning of the reign of Conrad III’s successor, Frederick I, royal estates in Upper Lusatia were taken into account by composing the Registry of Royal Table Estates. Finally, Milsko and Zagozd were taken out of the Wettins’ control and came under direct imperial supervision through the appointment of the Burgrave of Budyšín in 1156.

Based on the above, it can be concluded that approximately until the reign of Henry V, the territorial rulers (the Dukes of Bohemia and the margraves) didn’t tend to build strong power bases in Milsko. We must be aware, however, that both the range of royal delegation of powers and the lack of practical interest of the monarchs in how the province was governed in detail probably did not motivate the territorial rulers to build their castles or found monasteries there. It must be also remembered that all the possessors of Upper Lusatia in the eleventh and early twelfth century – including the homines novi, the Groitzsch lords – had their main residences and church foundations elsewhere and thus were not willing to invest in Upper Lusatia first. The situation changed considerably during the reign of Lothair III. From that moment on, the policies of the successive monarchs were confronted with the increasingly active strategies employed by the territorial rulers, the undertakings of Soběslav I being the best example thereof. Eventual success of those strategies in this period was, however, still strongly dependent on the support of the monarchs.

6.1.3 The “Bohemian gambit” of Henry IV and its legacy

A good example of the interdependence of the monarchs and territorial rulers is the situation of Upper Lusatia after 1076 or rather 1081, when it was granted as a benefice to Duke Vratislav II. From that moment on, this land was frequently treated by the German kings as a bargaining chip for which they could ‘buy’ the friendship of the Bohemian dukes. Such a step was only possible because of the profound change of
the relations of the kings of Germany with their eastern neighbors, as compared to the beginning of the eleventh century. The young monarchies of East-Central Europe were in the 1070’s or 1080’s no longer a primary threat for the kings from the Salian dynasty – as long as their rulers didn’t conspire against the king with his really dangerous antagonists, the Saxon opposition (as Bolesław II the Generous of Poland did). In such circumstances, it was much more important for Henry IV to get rid of disloyal margraves even at the cost of passing some provinces to an external ruler (Vratislav II) or his Saxon relative (Wiprecht II of Groitzsch). Such a strategy, hardly imaginable from the viewpoint of present international relations, was a part of a masterly gambit. The successful collaboration of Henry IV and Vratislav II showed that good relations with the dukes of Bohemia allowed the emperor to assure both internal and external security of the eastern borderland of the Empire. To give one province away as a fief in order to check all potential enemies – the Piasts, the Árpáds and their own Saxon subjects – was, after all, quite a good deal for the emperors. That is why Henry V, Lothair III, and later also Conrad III before 1143 and Frederick I after 1156 followed in the footsteps of Henry IV, building their eastern policy upon the alliance with the dukes of Bohemia.

Such a consequent strategy of “buying” the support of the Dukes of Bohemia i.a. through granting them Upper Lusatia – interrupted only in the later years of Conrad III’s reign and in the early years of Frederick I (1143–1157) – had a strong impact on the further history of this land. From 1157 until 1635 (formally even longer), it was a part of the Bohemian political system. Frederick I was probably not aware of (and maybe even not interested in) the long-term consequences of his decisions concerning Milsko made in 1157. It is striking, however, that throughout the subsequent 33 years of his rule the energetic emperor made no efforts to reverse the consequences of those decisions, although he had fairly many opportunities to do so. In fact, Frederick I in the years 1172–1190 exercised such a strong impact on Bohemia, as none of his predecessors had. Even if the creation of the Margraviate of Moravia by the emperor is only a historiographical, not historical fact, it cannot be denied that it was Frederick who instituted a few subsequent monarchs in Bohemia, for a few years occupied one of Bohemian provinces (Sedlecko) and proclaimed the Bishop of Prague a Prince of the Empire (Reichsfürst) (see Kejř 1992, 260–282). Neither his predecessors nor successors held so much power over Bohemia. At the same time, the emperor not only made no efforts to recover Upper Lusatia, but even left it in the hands of the Přemyslids along with the Burgraviate in Budyšín, which was in 1175 administered by a Bohemian noble named Wok (cf. CDB 1, no. 278: Woc prefectus de Budisin). It seems, therefore, that even if the decision to practically withdraw from Upper Lusatia in 1157 was made by the emperor on an ad hoc basis, it was seen by the monarch as rational and well-founded also through further 33 years of his reign. If Frederick wanted to occupy some possession of the Duke of Bohemia, this was not the distant land upon Spree and Nysa, but Sedlecko, directly neighboring to his demesne around Cheb (Eger). It seems, therefore, that after 1156 Frederick I shifted from the policies employed by
Conrad III and himself quite knowingly and purposely. With the Přemyslids, as weak as never, in Upper Lusatia and five sons of Conrad the Great of Wettin in the fatherly allods and marches, the emperor had every right to assume that there was no real threat for his rule in the southern Polabia and no need to maintain any extraordinary measures of direct control over most remote provinces of his realm.

A look at the later history of Upper Lusatia shows clearly that it was the institutional framework created by the second Staufer on the German throne (the royal dignity of the Bohemian ruler, the beneficiary status of Upper Lusatia, and the Burgraviate of Budyšín) that allowed the Přemyslids to maintain permanent control of this province. It has to be admitted that if granting Upper Lusatia as a fief to Vladislav II in 1157 finally resulted in this region falling out of royal control, then the strategy of the intensification of the structural means, applied in the period 1142–1156, could have theoretically been more beneficial for the Crown. However, this problem calls for further research on the period after 1157 and the actual scope of power exercised by the Přemyslids in this region. It cannot be also ruled out that Frederick I’s volte-face in 1157 should be interpreted in the context of general transformations in the structure of the Empire under this monarch, whose relationships with the princes was increasingly becoming based on feudal grants. It is against this background that the fiasco of this policy should be evaluated: after the death of Henry VI, within one generation, the princes of the Empire (Reichsfürsten) gained considerable sovereignty and Bohemia turned into a strong kingdom, keeping in grasp some imperial territories (i.a. Upper Lusatia). However, probably neither Frederick I nor his contemporaries were able to foresee such a course of events in the mid-twelfth century or even later. After all, it was dominium mundi, and not direct control over the infrastructure of governance and the resources of all provinces of the Empire that was concerning Barbarossa and his counselors. From this point of view, it was much more important for the monarch to have the Duke of Bohemia aside under the walls of Milan than to personally appoint the burgrave in Budyšín.

6.2 The infrastructure of governance and its developments

The effectiveness of power exercise in the provinces was dependent on the quality of infrastructure and the amount of control over it. In the early years of the period discussed in this book, the infrastructure consisted primarily of military facilities, i.e. ringfords. As I have tried to show in Chapter 2, in Upper Lusatia, including its eastern part originally inhabited by the Besunzane, the key phase of the military infrastructure extension occurred most probably before the incorporation of this land into Ekkehard I’s march and was carried out by the Milčane. However, the details of this process remain unknown and will remain so until further archaeological research, ideally based on state-of-the-art absolute dating methodology, bring new conclusive data. Due to the lack of adequate dating of archaeological sites, it is difficult to determine...
the contribution of Ekkehard and his successors (including the Piasts) to the extension of Milsko’s military infrastructure after ca. 990. Probably, it was mainly reorganized (e.g. the construction or extension of the castrum minus on Landeskrone). The Ekkehardines’ largest organizational contribution was indisputably the introduction of the burgward organization in Milsko. As was indicated in sub-chapters 5.3–5.4, in all likelihood, the system originally spread up to the easternmost sections of the region. However, in Eastern Upper Lusatia, there are no clear traces of it because the subregion was completely devastated in 1015, and was restored under a totally different organizational structure: demesnes owned by the margraves (later by the kings) and the bishops.

Compared to the time of the intensive campaigns for Milsko in 1002–1031, in the later periods the military infrastructure in Eastern Upper Lusatia was considerably smaller. In the mid-eleventh century both internal and external pacification took place in Upper Lusatia and there was no need to maintain numerous ringforts any more. This phenomenon may be observed also in the easternmost part of the region, which was subject to a detailed study in the Chapter 5. With the current state of knowledge, it is difficult to determine how long the hillforts in Niedów and Jauernick were in use. As for the former, site no. 1 was in operation up to a certain time when it was probably replaced by the defensive facility in Ręczyn. It seems, however, that in the eleventh century those facilities were the centers of the ecclesiastical (Niedów/ Ręczyn) and secular demesnes as in the latter part of that century they served as the seats of proto-parishes. The stronghold in Niedów/Ręczyn was probably – until the twelfth century construction of the castle in Zawidów (mentioned in 1188: CDS 2–1, no. 61) – the only defensive facility in the episcopal estates. There were probably two others in the secular demesne: the bipartite stronghold in Bratków and the Drewnow hillfort in what was later to be Görlitz. The largest of these facilities (and probably the most frequently used) was the stronghold in Bratków, which provides evidence for the significance of the contacts with Bohemia through the Nysa Valley. The situation changed dramatically in Eastern Upper Lusatia when it was granted to Soběslav I, who established the center of the newly-founded pagus Isgorelik in Görlitz, probably due to his geopolitical reorientation (the alliance with King Lothair III and the conflict with the Polish duke, Bolesław III Wrymouth).

Based on the limited number of sources, it can be argued that in Eastern Upper Lusatia, the non-military elements of the infrastructure were extensively developed, in view of the fact it was the most remote of the provinces. The period before 1071 saw the process of internal colonization, which resulted in the establishment of the local demesne around Görlitz. Worth emphasizing is the fact that both the secular and ecclesiastical demesnes had their own proto-parishes already in the latter half of the eleventh century or in the early twelfth century. The infrastructure of governance was maintained and extended by the representatives of the royal power in the region: either counts or beneficial possessors. The initiative of the monarchs themselves or the court circles should not be overestimated here. The establishment of the royal
estates by the Nysa River was not a result of any consciously far-sighted policies of the Salians. It was rather a ‘spin-off’ effect of another event, which was the extinction of the Ekkehardines, legacy of whom was taken over by Henry III. In fact, only the reigns of Lothair III in Germany (1125–1137) and of Soběslav I in Bohemia (1125–1140) brought a profound change in the attitude of first the territorial rulers and then the monarchs towards the local infrastructure of governance. This conclusion is fully consistent with the results obtained in Chapters 3–4 and related to in the sections 6.1.1–6.1.2: intensification of policies of, first, territorial rulers, and only later the monarchs, towards Upper Lusatia in the same period.

6.3 Concluding remarks and epilogue

Finally, the question must be asked, what do we learn from the study on a region that was – according to the evidence collected in the sub-chapter 1.3 – virtually the furthest pertinence for all the policies that were trying to govern it? First and foremost, it must be stated that the results of the above study are concordant with the general assumption presented in the sub-chapter 1.2 that the most effective way of ruling such a province was to “outsource” its management. This was certainly the general strategy of most of the monarchs towards Upper Lusatia in the High Middle Ages. The only exceptions from that practice before ca 1200 were the policies of Henry II and Conrad II at the beginning of his reign and of the first two Staufers, who really tried to tighten their control over the eastern borderland, including not only Upper but also Lower Lusatia (cf. Lehmann 1966, 7–9). Nevertheless, the prevailing attitude of the monarchs was to avoid exercising direct control over their easternmost province, though without losing their overlordship. In the tenth century a comfortable way to get rid of directly governing Upper Lusatia was to leave it to the local Slavic polity (the Milčane), and from the 1080’s on: to grant this region as a benefice to either Saxon nobles or Dukes of Bohemia. Admittedly, between those two periods there was a ca. 90-years’ long intermezzo when royal margraves ruled Milsko. However, only for about six years there was a separate count residing in Budyšin and only until ca. 1046 Upper Lusatia was perceived as a separate territory, that might be called “a potential march”. Moreover, this period of relatively tighter royal control concurred with the times of increased rivalry between the monarchs of East-Central Europe (1002–1054). This may be brought in accordance with another assumption presented in the sub-chapter 1.2: that governance intensity increased when the stability of rule of a center of power in a given province decreased due to an external threat. As long as the threat was over in the 1040’s and 1050’s, Upper Lusatia ceased being a subject of particular interest for either monarchs or their counts.

In the first chapter of this book it has been stated that the possessing of the most remote provinces of a larger polity could have been perceived as an opportunity for the territorial rulers and nobles to build strong fundations for their power and position. It
has to be recalled here that the margraves ruling both Upper and Lower Lusatia were granted a huge portion of freedom in those lands, the case of Ekkehard II being the best example of such a practice. Also the position of later beneficial possessors of Upper Lusatia was strong and until 1143 in fact not limited by the direct influence of the monarchs, which became real and direct only in 1156. In face of such royal liberality, it seems puzzling that it was only Soběslav I who actively took full advantage of all the powers and possibilities granted to him by Emperor Lothair III, founding a castle in Görlitz, granting incomes from the area to some church institute chosen by him and so on. On the other hand, some insights into the local infrastructure of governance presented in the Chapter 5 show clearly that both the Ekkehardines and the lords of Groitzsch were not passive in this most remote province, organizing resettlement of devastated areas, maintaining some fortresses and founding churches; the same may be said about the Bishops of Meissen. Our view of past developments may also be to some extent distorted by the rapid extinction of the Ekkehardines and the lords of Groitzsch. Notwithstanding, even those families, for whom the possessing of Upper Lusatia must have been important, were focused primarily on their main areas of interest, i.e. their hereditary possessions and marches. One may hypothesize that they simply didn't have enough resources to actively colonize and integrate such distant areas. It seems, therefore, that Upper Lusatia was for a long time an extremely remote periphery not only for the monarchs, but also for other actors.

The perception of Upper Lusatia among the representatives of the political authority at various levels seems to have changed, at least to some extent, during the reigns of Lothair III in Germany (1125–1137) and of Soběslav I in Bohemia (1125–1140). The region which by then had been regarded as a rather unattractive, troublesome and remote province that had to be quickly ceded (as in the case of Vratislav II) became a place where the territorial rulers attempted to extend their power while the German kings tried to maintain the impact on who would rule the area and in what way. In this respect, Upper Lusatia did not differ much from other areas of southern Polabia. Also in the neighboring Poland under Bolesław Wrymouth (1102–1138) attempts were made to tighten the ducal control of the borderlands through creation of marches (cf. Lalik 1966, 830, passim, and further references by Gawlas 2000, 74–75, 187, fn. 913–914). Admittedly, in Upper Lusatia the royal authority started its “structural offensive” two generations later than in the land of the Nižane. It was not until 1156 that the Burgraviate of Budyšín was established by Frederick I, while an analogous institution was set up in Dohna at the initiative of Henry V in 1112. On the other hand, the burgraviate for Lower Lusatia (in Cottbus) was founded as late as in Budyšín. The fate of those burgraviates was also significant: both of them came out of the control of the kings soon after 1156, the former probably turned into a noble estate (cf. Lehmann 1966, 7, 14, 21–24) and the latter: taken over by the Přemyslids. It seems, therefore,
that in the long run it was not the objective of the kings of Germany to control directly either Upper or Lower Lusatia (cf. also above, section 6.1.1). That is how those regions fell into hands of the territorial rulers. The Přemyslids after 1156, even though they still had no resources to massively colonize and re-organize the land, kept the Burgraviate of Budyšin under their control, and thus practically retained the rule over the region. That was their springboard to the full control over this province, obtained both on formal and practical levels under King Přemysl Ottocar I (1198–1230).

From the above we may learn that sole désintéressement of the German kings with their easternmost provinces did not create a vacuum, which automatically would be filled by any of the actors involved: the margraves, Saxon nobles, or – last but not least – other monarchs. In fact, this vacuum was filled with some structures allowing for effective control over the land only in 1156 (the burgraviate of Budyšin) and after 1212 (chartered towns and villages, noble domains and royal castles founded on behalf of Přemysl Ottocar I). Before the mid-twelfth century neither the kings nor their potential competitors – with the significant exception of Soběslav I, who fitted first the pagus Isgorelik, and later the cura Sirbiae into the framework of his active policies inland and abroad – were ready to invest huge resources in this area by building castles, founding monasteries, launching colonization and so on. On the other hand, basic control over the infrastructure of governance was maintained and some important investments made, both by the margraves before 1081 (e.g. resettlement and colonization in the Eastern Upper Lusatia) and by the lords of Groitzsch (e.g. foundation of the parish church in Jauernick). Therefore, it seems that both the kings and territorial rulers were willing to and capable of investing in the power basis in the eastern provinces but probably not able to mobilize huge resources for that purpose. This resembles the situation of Theoderic of Landsberg after 1156, who made various efforts in order to build strong basis of power in Saxon Eastern March and Lower Lusatia, but faced shortage of resources to invest (money, colonists, skilled professionals), at least compared to the excessive requirements (cf. Lindner 2013, 161).

It was probably the shortage of assets to invest confronted with low expected return rates that made Vratislav I in 1080’s and Frederick I in 1157 give walkover in Upper Lusatia. What is very instructive in this context, is that in the 1150’s, unlike 80 years before, neither the monarch nor the territorial rulers – the margrave and the bishop – withdrew from the land of the Nižane. It seems that in the mid-twelfth century this region was already developed and organized well enough to become subject of vivid interest of theirs as a source of income and a strategically important place where sovereign lordship could be created (cf. here Thieme, Kobuch 2005, 81–87). On the contrary, both in the 1070's/1080's and after 1156, the monarchs were ready to give Lower and Upper Lusatia away with no regrets. Moreover, this désintéressement of the kings was accompanied by désintéressement of other actors, which in Upper Lusatia lasted at least until the last quarter of the twelfth century.
It was only in the 1180’s that we hear about a conflict of the Bishop Martin of Meissen with nobles from the Kittlitz family, concerning the Zawidów (mons Syden = Seidenberg) domain (CDS 2–1, no. 61; cf. lately Dannenberg 2010, 50); also the beginnings of the merchant settlements which later evolved into chartered towns (cf. Blaschke 1984/2003; Blaschke 1997/2003b) and of the rural colonization by Görlitz\textsuperscript{148} probably reached before the year 1200. These processes were running parallel to the active policy of Bolesław the Tall, Duke of Silesia, who in the fourth quarter of the twelfth century was building an enclave of his concentrated power in the southwestern corner of his duchy (cf. Zientara 1971/2013, 71–77; Wójcik 2006, 73–74; Fokt 2015, 14). It was probably then that the Upper Road was created, becoming not only potential source of income for the rulers but also an incentive for the local economic growth. Around the year 1200, the wave of colonists from the west reached this province, which was soon transformed on behalf of the Přemyslids and their competitors, the Bishops of Meissen, into a well-developed and urbanized land. This was, however, a different story than the one we know from the previous period: a story of a region, where there were assets to compete for, and of the parties who were capable of mobilizing enough support, money, settlers, knights and merchants to effectively take part in such a contest. These two factors – profitability of possessing a particular province and ability of the rulers to mobilize respective assets in order to effectively control it – seem to have been key issues in the High Middle Ages. Only the regions, where these factors met, became subjects to the intensive and lasting interest of the monarchs and territorial rulers. This is, however, a different story to tell, concerning the period after 1156.

\textsuperscript{148} The methodology of identifying the oldest merchant settlements developed by Blaschke was, partially justly, criticized by Marta Młynarska-Kaletynowa (1978); nevertheless, especially in case of Görlitz the sole existence of the original settlement by the St.-Nicolas Church (Nikolaikirche) suggests the very beginnings of this center at least a generation before the first mention of the chartered town in 1234, probably not later than the beginnings of the rural colonization, which, according to the dendrochronological dating of the church in Ludwigsdorf (Noky et al. 2005, 6, \textit{passim}), began certainly before the year 1200.
Burden and Province are synonymous, and they have mutual synonyms. Since there are no beasts of burden or land vehicles available, even the mighty and skilled armies of the empire have a problem of being constantly overstretched, despite there being garrisons and foot messengers in every province. Source: Literature / Lands of Red and Gold. Cite this Source. Remote work may be demanding and difficult notably in the beginnings. Of course, the advantages and comfort that comes with working from any place are immense. Yet the obstacles which remote workers have to face may cause a lot of problems and lead to the lack of work-life balance. Especially that with the digitization in business and technological progress, the number of people working remotely will increase. In the report by Intuit, it is stated that There are some challenges of remote working that you and the organization you work for must overcome in order for you to be successful. In this article, I’ll share with you 10 challenges that I had to overcome in order to succeed as a remote employee at Time Doctor. See how Time Doctor’s easy-to-use time tracking software can help your team be more productive. Who is that? As a remote employee, working alone in my home office, I don’t have the luxury of creating a social life around my work friends. To combat this, I take a proactive approach to keep my social calendar as full as possible, work from a local cafe or spend my work day at a co-working space. I routinely meet up with local friends for dinner and drinks after work.